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INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal
government from "taking" property for a public purpose without pay-
ing just compensation.' The Supreme Court has come to interpret the
clause to require that the government compensate real property own-
ers in some unclear class of cases when regulation of the property has
resulted in severe economic losses.2 The proposition that regulation
alone, without appropriation, occupation, or use by the government,
can work a taking is known as the "regulatory takings" doctrine.3
The regulatory takings doctrine is a pernicious mess. It should be
dispatched to whatever afterlife sustains the spirits of such deceased
doctrines as constitutional review of ratemaking and measurement of
"direct effects on commerce."'4 The current rules are a hodgepodge
that the Court has been unable to explain. But worse, the doctrine
protects economic interests in the development of land against other-
wise valid enactments of the democratic process, thereby inhibiting
experimentation with new environmental initiatives.5 The effect the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See infra parts I-111.
3. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the
Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
4. At one time the Court reviewed regulated rates under the Due Process Clause to
ensure that public utilities received a fair return on a fair present value of their property.
See, e.g., Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522-25 (1898). At the same time, the Court sought
to distinguish between valid and invalid congressional exercises of the commerce power by
ascertaining whether the regulated activity had a "direct" or "indirect" effect on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1895); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-48 (1935). Both efforts were eventually
abandoned as doctrinally and politically untenable. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
36-41 (1937).
5. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (requiring
compensation for South Carolina's attempt to restrict environmentally destructive devel-
opment on barrier islands); cf Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1
(1990) (suggesting a taking under the National Trail Systems Act's "Rails to Trails"
provision).
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doctrine has of frustrating democratic attempts to protect the environ-
ment is reminiscent of the way judges once used the notion of substan-
tive due process to frustrate legislative attempts to regulate the hours
and conditions of work.6
Most authors view takings as including the entire field of reduc-
tion of economic value due to government action. My focus in this
article is narrower: I consider only regulatory actions and accept the
constitutional propriety of requiring compensation for most appropri-
ations and permanent physical invasions. 7 I do not directly address
the abstract issue of when justice requires compensation for regula-
tory losses, although at the end of the article I do argue that this ques-
tion is essentially political.
I will present ten arguments why the Supreme Court should over-
rule Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon8 and its progeny, the line of
cases that established the regulatory takings doctrine. My ten argu-
ments are heterogeneous and grounded in different traditions of con-
stitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, the article proceeds logically:
each argument builds on the previous one. In an addendum, I provide
an example of a compensation statute designed to crystalize land-
owner expectations to promote better and less wasteful land use
control.
I
NEITHER THE TEXT, THE INTENTION OF THE FRAMERS, NOR THE
FIRST ONE HUNDRED THIRTY YEARS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO REGULATION OF
LAND USE
Neither the text of the Fifth Amendment nor the circumstances
of its adoption suggests that its proponents had any expectation that
the Takings Clause would provide an enforceable limitation on gov-
ernment regulation of land use. The Fifth Amendment provides that:
"Private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." 9 The term "taken" indicates a prohibited governmental
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (finding that the 60-hour
work week imposed upon the bakery violates the right of private parties to contract); Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2327 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The so-called
,regulatory takings' doctrine ... has obvious kinship with the line of substantive due pro-
cess cases that Lochner exemplified.").
7. 1 also sidestep issues raised by conditional appropriations or exactions. See Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309-31. These
raise distinct and subtle problems: they address circumstances under which the government
may assume ownership of private property without paying compensation because the
transfer mitigates concerns about a development project that could have led the govern-
ment to prohibit it had the government not imposed conditions.
8. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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act, emphasizing the passing of property from the owner to the gov-
ernment.10 The Takings Clause provides no standard to evaluate gov-
ernmental actions, as would have been the case if the clause included
the words "too far" or "unreasonable." The status of being taken, like
that of being pregnant, is a matter of fact, not of degree. In short, the
clause prohibits only expropriation; facially it says nothing about the
economic effects of regulation or other government activity.
The language of the first ten amendments, ratified together in
1791, confirms the limited scope of the word "taken" in the Fifth
Amendment. The drafters employed both words of category and
words of degree in other amendments and could easily have used
either in the Takings Clause. Instead they chose to use a categorical
expression for governmental takings.
Comparison with other amendments elucidates this point. On
the one hand, the drafters clearly state that, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion"" and that, "[n]o soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the owner."' 2 These commands prohibit all acts that fall within the
designated categories.' 3 Other amendments, in contrast, prohibit "un-
reasonable searches and seizures"' 4 and "excessive fines."' 5 In the
Fifth Amendment, the drafters, using absolute language, required
compensation only when property was "taken" by government. They
neither commanded Congress to "make no law" respecting private
property nor prohibited "excessive" or "unreasonable" regulation of
property use. 16
10. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Towards a Coherent Jurispru-
dence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REv. 329, 432-33 & n.442 (1995) (arguing that the
term "take" connotes acquisition and thus is hard to reconcile with the regulatory takings
doctrine).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
13. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (describing the "wall of
separation" between church and state under the First Amendment); Engblum v. Carey, 677
F.2d 957, 961-62 (2d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the crux of a Third Amendment argument
is the nature of the property interest since the Constitution proscribes all quartering of
soldiers in any house without the owner's consent).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15. Id.
16. This is not to say that categorization (i.e., a per se rule) never admits of evalua-
tions of degree. For example, contemporary courts may struggle with whether particular
government aid to religious schools violates the Establishment Clause. See Aguiler v. Fel-
ton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). But when the framers used categorical language, they had in
mind a rather specific abuse, and subsequent extension of the constitutional prohibition to
a wider range of activities should be consonant with the spirit or tradition of the Constitu-
tion, the competence of the judiciary, and the needs of contemporary policy. In arguing
that the framers did not anticipate a regulatory takings doctrine, I am only trying to clarify
the criteria by which we should judge the judicially evolved rules.
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Historical studies of the adoption of the Takings Clause confirm
that the drafters intended it to reach only appropriation. A compre-
hensive study found that James Madison, the author of the Fifth
Amendment, intended the Takings Clause "to apply only to direct
physical taking of property by the federal government."'1 7 The draft-
ers apparently wrote this clause because colonial and early state legis-
latures had regularly taken property without paying .any
compensation, particularly by expropriating unimproved land for
roads and impressing goods for military purposes.'8 The Takings
Clause prohibited the federal government from engaging in these
hotly debated practices. It did not constrain the commonplace and
politically accepted regulation of land use by state and local
governments. 19
Proponents of a broad reading of the Takings Clause do not really
dispute this analysis. They argue, instead, that the framers entertained
a broad and absolute notion of the meaning of property protection
commanded by natural law.20 Proponents conclude on this basis that
the Takings Clause requires compensation whenever regulation
reduces the value of any economic asset.21 Whatever power this anal-
ysis might have to invigorate polemicists or confuse Members of Con-
gress, courts and constitutional scholars understand that the Fifth
Amendment creates no property rights at all; such rights are estab-
lished and defined by state law. 22
For more than one hundred years after the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause confirmed
17. William M. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985). Madison actually wrote
in an essay published shortly after the Bill of Rights had been adopted that now the federal
government was bound by the legal command that no property "shall be taken directly,
even for public use, without indemnification of the owner." James Madison, Property, in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON
179, 186-88 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981).
18. Treanor, supra note 17, at 695-98.
19. FRED P. BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 104 (1973); see also WILLIAM
CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 73, 149 (1984) (noting regulations against, inter alia, the
sale of private land without town approval and grazing cattle on eroded sand dunes). Re-
cent historical research has emphasized that in America before the Civil War, regulation of
all economic activity was pervasive and viewed as supportive of a "well-ordered market."
William J. Novak, Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market, Law and Economic Reg-
ulation in 19th Century America, 18 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 2 (1993).
20. See MARK POLLrI-r, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 33-49 (1993); BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980).
21. See POLLrIT, supra note 20, at 69-83.
22. Conservative scholars disturbed by the Warren and Burger Courts' broad readings
of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment have put forward many of the criticisms of such a
natural law reading of the Constitution. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 224-30 (1990).
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the narrow, historically grounded interpretation. Until 1922, virtually
no court found a taking when regulation restricted use but amounted
neither to outright expropriation nor to permanent physical occupa-
tion.23 The 1887 Supreme Court decision in Mugler v. Kansas24 is the
paradigm case. In Mugler, the Court stated the broad principle that a
regulatory measure passed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
the public does not effect a taking, even if it severely diminishes the
value of an owner's property.2 5 Mugler was no sport, but instead the
leading decision of a line firmly entrenched before the advent of Penn-
sylvania Coal thirty-five years later.26
Mugler has sometimes been said to embody a "nuisance excep-
tion" to the general rule requiring compensation when regulation is
too burdensome.2 7 Such an anachronistic reading misinterprets
Mugler in at least two ways: it incorrectly limits the holding of the case
to common law nuisance, and it mistakes the general rule for an ex-
ception. A brief review of Mugler will elaborate this criticism.
The dispute in Mugler arose from the 1880 Kansas constitution,
which enacted total prohibition of the manufacture, sale, or consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages. 28 Two brewers challenged its application
on the ground that it rendered their breweries and inventory nearly
valueless.2 9 The Court unanimously rejected this argument, stating in
sweeping terms:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legisla-
tion does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property
for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.30
As the passage above indicates, the Mugler Court interpreted
government's power to regulate without paying compensation as ex-
tending to the whole field of legitimate state regulation under the po-
23. For a rare exception, see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (Ct. App. 1856).
24. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
25. Id. at 668.
26. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a law barring the
operation of a brick mill in a residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(upholding an order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby
orchards); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding a law effectively
preventing continued operation of a quarry in a residential area).
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144-46 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (characterizing Mugler as a "nuisance exception to the taking
guarantee").
28. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624-25.
29. Id. at 653-55.
30. Id. at 668-69.
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lice power. The Court in no sense confined regulation to the
abatement of common law nuisances. The Court referred to the main-
tenance of a brewery as a nuisance, but only because the Kansas Leg-
islature so declared it.31 In relying on this declaration, the Court not
only expressed indifference to whether breweries were nuisances at
common law, but emphatically stated that the power to declare a use
as injurious to the public interest "is lodged with the legislative
branch.'32 Moreover, the Mugler Court acknowledged the power of
the legislature to characterize its action as the prevention of a harm,
rather than the appropriation of a public benefit, subject to judicial
review.33 The Court limited its judicial review of this power to ascer-
taining that the law has a "real and substantial relation" to harm
prevention.34
Rather than creating an exception, Mugler unanimously an-
nounced a broad and important rule that faithfully implemented the
intention of the drafters of the Fifth Amendment. 35 Numerous state
cases had already firmly established the principle adopted by
Mugler.36 In the once famous Commonwealth v. Alger,37 Chief Justice
Shaw stated the general rule:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of a well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute
and qualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community .... This is very
different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government
to take and appropriate to public use, whenever the public exigency
31. Id. at 660-61.
32. Id.; see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140 (1894) ("While the legislature has
no right arbitrarily to declare that to be a nuisance which is clearly not so, a good deal must
be left to discretion in that regard, and if the object to be accomplished is conducive to the
public interests, it may exercise a large liberty of choice in the means employed.").
33. Id.
34. Thus, in effect this case holds that regulations that satisfy the Due Process Clause
do not raise takings concerns. See id. at 661.
35. The only other Supreme Court decision of the nineteenth century that indicates
any intention to give a broad reading of the Takings Clause is Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), where the Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applied the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to the states. After arguing at some
length that providing compensation for appropriated property was a matter of fundamen-
tal fairness, however, the Court affirmed the state court's decision to award the railroad
only nominal compensation for the city's taking of railroad land for a public street. Id. at
258.
36. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,84-85 (1851); Commonwealth
v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846); Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New
York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826); People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1885); Lakeview v. Rose
Hill Cemetery Co., 70 II1. 191 (1873); Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751 (1881).
37. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 84-85.
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requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reason-
able compensation therefor .... Nor does the prohibition of such a
noxious use of property [i.e., injurious to the public,] although it may
diminish the profits of the owner, make it an appropriation to public
use, so as to entitle the owner to compensation. 38
It is instructive to consider the paucity of precedent for compen-
sation that the brewers were able to urge upon the Court in Mugler.39
The prior decision chiefly at issue was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,40
the only decision in the nineteenth century in which the Court ordered
payment of compensation when the government had not appropriated
title to property.
In Pumpelly the defendant had built a state-authorized dam that
flooded the plaintiff's land.41 While acknowledging the general valid-
ity of many cases holding that the state is not liable for "consequential
injury" to property arising from the construction of improvements, the
Court held: "[W]here the real estate is actually invaded by super-
induced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by hav-
ing any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectively destroy or
impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion."'42 Counsel for the brewers in Mugler argued that, under
Pumpelly, measures that in any way destroy the value of property re-
quire just compensation. 43 The Court had little difficulty distinguish-
ing Pumpelly as involving a "permanent... physical invasion" and a
"practical ouster of possession.""4 The Court saw these problems as
conceptually distinct, and to this day the Supreme Court treats cases
of "permanent physical invasion" quite differently from those of use
regulation. 45
38. Id.
39. The validity of prohibition laws that rendered valueless the equipment and inven-
tory of the merchant of alcoholic beverages was one of the most litigated constitutional
issues of the period around the Civil War. The New York Court of Appeals held that such
uncompensated impairments of value violated due process of law. Wynehamer v. People,
13 N.Y. 378 (1856). However, all other state courts of appeal to address the issue upheld
uncompensated prohibition for reasons similar to those relied on in Mugler. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 27-28 (1854). Note also that prohibition shares with
abolitionism and environmentalism a protestant reformist urge to establish that certain
subjects ethically cannot be the objects of property rights.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
41. Id. at 166, 171.
42. Id. at 180-81.
43. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 633-37, 648-49 (1887).
44. Id. at 668.
45. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434
(1982) (upholding the historical rule that "when the 'character of the government action is
a permanent physical occupation of property our cases uniformly have found a taking...
withot regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner' "). As in Mugler's construction of Pumpelly, the
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II
PENNSYLVANIA COAL IS A POORLY CONSIDERED DECISION
THAT OUGHT TO BE OVERRULED
The modern doctrine of regulatory takings sprang without obvi-
ous antecedents from the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.46 Courts and commentators have looked back to Justice
Holmes' decision as the touchstone for later doctrinal development-
and as the origin of the immense confusion that engulfs contemporary
takings law.4 7 In fact, it is a wretched decision, inadequately ex-
plained and having no foundation in precedent.
Pennsylvania Coal held unconstitutional the Kohler Act,4 a
Pennsylvania statute that made it unlawful to mine coal beneath the
property of another in such a way as to cause the collapse of the sur-
face.49 The Pennsylvania Legislature had passed the Act in the wake
of technological developments in coal mining that had led to the sink-
ing of numerous dwellings, streets, churches, and railroad lines.50
Pennsylvania law had long treated support as a separate estate in land,
distinct from surface ownership and mineral rights.51 Until passage of
the Kohler Act, state law had permitted mining companies to sell sur-
face lots while retaining the legal right to extract coal.52
The case began when the coal company sent the Mahons a letter
informing them that in less than two weeks the mining operations be-
neath their home would reach a point where their house and land
would start to sink.53 Forty-four years earlier, their predecessor in in-
terest had bought the land but not the support estate from the com-
pany.54 When the Mahons sought an injunction against continued
mining on the grounds that it violated the Kohler Act, the company
answered that the Act was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligations of contract and took property without paying just compen-
sation.55 After the state court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the
Court has also continued to resist the conflation of physical invasion and regulation cases.
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529, 1531 (1992).
46. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
47. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984) (stating that Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
seems to have generated most of the current confusion about takings).
48. Act of May 27, 1921, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
49. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
50. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492-93 (Pa. 1922), rev'd, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).
51. Id. at 493.
52. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412, 414.
53. See Mahon, 118 A. at 492.
54. See id at 495.
55. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
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police power, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act
violated the Takings Clause.56
Given the significance of the decision, the opinion by Justice
Holmes is remarkably brief. Holmes gives little guidance as to the
basis for his decision. He concedes that the government must be able
to diminish property values to some extent in the course of regulation
without paying compensation, 57 but simply asserts that when the dimi-
nution reaches a certain magnitude, it exceeds implied limits, requir-
ing the government to pay compensation.58 He suggests that judges
must determine whether an economic loss is "too great" on the basis
of the particular facts of each case and in light of the gravity of the
public interest served.59
Holmes' opinion is seriously defective in several respects. First,
he gives no hint as to why he thinks Mugler, its state antecedents, and
numerous Supreme Court antecedents were wrong or inadequate.
Holmes later wrote privately to Laski that "old Harlan's decision in
Mugler v. Kansas was pretty fishy,"6 but nowhere provides reasoned
justification for his failure to follow precedent. This lacuna has not
only sown confusion about the continued meaning of those prece-
dents, but has also obscured the ground upon which Pennsylvania
Coal itself stands.
Second, Holmes fails to address the related question as to what
constitutional values the new rule may further. All he offers is the
observation that, unless the power of government to diminish eco-
nomic values in property is somehow limited, "the contract and due
process clauses are gone."'61 But this is plainly untrue, since the Tak-
ings Clause would still require compensation in cases of appropriation
or permanent physical invasion.62
Third, although the decision appears to turn on the magnitude of
economic harm suffered by the coal company, the opinion offers little
insight into how great that harm was. For example, the decision
evinces no attempt to quantify the loss in dollar figures.63 Holmes
does state that the company lost all of the coal that remained in place
as surely as if it were appropriated. But he acknowledges that the
56. Id. at 412, 414.
57. Id. at 413.
58. Id. at 415.
59. See id. at 413. Justice Brandeis dissented, invoking the long line of cases holding
that, absent an appropriation, regulation of property to protect the public does not effect a
taking even if it diminishes economic value. Id. at 417, 420, 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. 1 MARK D. HOWE, THE HOLMES LASKI LE-TERS 346 (1963).
61. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
62. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
63. The company certainly did not suffer as great a proportional economic loss as did
the brewery owner in Mugler. See supra text accompanying note 28 (describing plaintiff's
loss in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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state can require coal to be left in place for some safety purposes,64 so
that even if the diminishment is 100% loss, such a wipeout would not
be dispositive. Moreover, Holmes notoriously does not explain why
the coal left in place rather than the entire mineral estate is the appro-
priate benchmark against which to measure the diminished value.
Fourth, the opinion is woefully inadequate in its appraisal of the
legislative purpose of the Kohler Act. In the first half of his opinion,
Holmes eccentrically insists on treating the case as a private dispute,
as if the legislation were restricted to benefitting the Mahons. 65 He
notes that their safety is not at risk because they received timely no-
tice.66 Proceeding in this fashion, he concludes that the Act does not
"disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruc-
tion of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights."'67
We know that the first draft of the opinion ended at this point.68
Chief Justice Taft, who supported the result, then sent Holmes a
memo suggesting that he had not adequately addressed the full reach
of the Act as urged by amici, particularly the state and the city of
Scranton.69 Influenced by Taft's correspondence, Holmes then tacked
on additional paragraphs acknowledging (rather sardonically) that the
Act addressed a legitimate public concern, but arguing that it imposed
too great a loss upon the coal company.70 He concludes this section
by writing: "So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to
take the risk of acquiring only the surface rights, we cannot see that
the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants giving to them
greater rights than they bought."'71
Holmes' assessment of the Kohler Act is flawed in three ways.
First, the bargains struck in the sale of surface rights plainly impose
negative externalities; various parties who had no part in the contracts
suffered from the subsidence, as the brief of the city of Scranton re-
lated in lurid tones:
Broken brick and rubble [cover] great areas formerly improved with
handsome business blocks but now permitted, in the words of Gover-
nor Sproul, "to revert to the wilderness of abandon." Our once level
streets are in humps and sags, our gas mains have broken, our water
mains threatened to fail us in time of conflagration, our sewers spread
their pestilential contents into the soil, our buildings have collapsed
64. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (construing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914)).
65. See id. at 413.
66. Id. at 414.
67. Id.
68. See Joseph F. DiMento, Mining the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Con-
stitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL Hisr. 396, 406 (1990).
69. Id. at 406-07.
70. See id. at 406-08.
71. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
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under their occupants or fallen into the streets, our people have been
swallowed up in suddenly yawning chasms, blown up by gas explosions
or asphyxiated in their sleep, our cemeteries have opened and the
bodies of our dead have been torn from their caskets. '72
Even discounting the talent for melodrama of the Scranton solicitor, it
seems plain that in enacting the Kohler Act, the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture might well have been responding to concerns about public safety
and economic well-being far beyond the interests of those who made
or profited from a bad bargain.73
Second, to the property owners who suffered from their bargain,
the terrible consequences of that bargain might far exceed the reason-
able expectations of the parties at the initial sale. The Kohler Act
seems no broader than necessary to prevent the widespread catastro-
phe created by coal extraction and the increased population of the
coal mining region.74
Finally, there is a more general objection: however much skepti-
cal scholars and justices may doubt such rationales, more public-spir-
ited legislators may have found them persuasive. Holmes' opinion
contains no justification for his jaundiced view of the legislative pur-
pose. The Constitution no more enacts the theories of James
Buchanan 75 than it does those of Herbert Spencer.76 It is disquieting
that a justice inaugurating a new, nontextual constitutional limitation
72. Brief for the City of Scranton, Intervenor, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
73. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,474-75 (1987)
(stating that coal mining subsidence can have "devastating effects," such as damage to
foundations, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings);
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1126-27 (1977) (finding that subsidence in urban
areas causes "substantial damage" to surface improvements, including private homes, com-
mercial buildings, public roads, and schools).
74. See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492-93 (Pa. 1922).
75. The views of James M. Buchanan (winner of the 1987 Nobel Prize in economics)
are in the libertarian wing of the law and economics school. For example, in JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLUcx, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), the authors treat government as a cooperative
endeavor on the part of a number of people of differing tastes to increase their abilities to
reach their separate objectives. As in economics, the basic question becomes one of effi-
ciency-which set of governmental institutions will best serve the individual ends of the
citizens. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER (1991) (elaborating Buchanan's contractarian approach to economics and
applying it to the U.S. Constitution and the American social order); GEOFFREY BRENNAN
& JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER To TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL
CONSTITUTION 164-65 (1980) (questioning the power of the state to pass legislation to pro-
vide clean air and clean water-or, in fact, to secure any public good-without
compensation).
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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on the legislative power should assume without argument such a pessi-
mistic attitude toward the process of self-government. 77
Observers have long wondered what Holmes thought he was do-
ing in Pennsylvania Coal.78 No similar difficulty clouds the evaluation
of what the justices who joined Holmes thought they were about. The
Taft Court was the Silver Age of substantive due process; essentially
the same court that struck down the Kohler Act in 1922 also struck
down the federal minimum wage law in 192379 and thirty exercises of
state power between 1923 and 1937.80 In fact, the regulatory takings
doctrine was born in the era of substantive due process and reflects
that heritage. 81
The subsequent history of Pennsylvania Coal is full of irony. The
New Deal Court left the decision untouched while it swept away sub-
stantive due process.82 Numerous subsequent decisions treated its es-
tablishment of a limit on the economic burden that land use regulation
can impose as a settled issue of constitutional law.83 Yet the Supreme
77. In contrast, a strength of the Mugler line is that it accepts the public interest goals
of legislation so long as they have a rational basis. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,663
(1887).
78. Holmes' closest associates, Brandeis and Frankfurter, were embarrassed by the
opinion. See DiMento, supra note 68, at 415-16. Brandeis even suggested that the con-
servative justices somehow had pulled one over on the octogenarian Holmes in the wake of
a prostate operation. Id. at 416. Professor Fischel suggests that Holmes was reacting to
fears about inadequate coal supplies in light of widespread strikes in the anthracite fields.
William A. Fischel, Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the Supreme Court 13 (Oct.
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ecology Law Quarterly). The most
thoughtful assessment, by Daniel Ernst, attributes Pennsylvania Coal to Holmes' belief,
grounded in his historicist jurisprudence, that he could "divine in tradition, custom, and
social practices" those legislative victories that did not accord with dominant social prac-
tices. Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American History, 102 YALE
L.J. 1019, 1054-57 (1993). Ernst also remarks that a proper understanding of Holmes'
attachment to now implausible jurisprudential views should render Pennsylvania Coal "less
valuable than it is to today's opponents of land use regulation." Id. at 1055.
79. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUsTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 97 app. I
at 113-18 (1938) (listing cases holding state action invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). Frankfurter discreetly passed over Pennsylvania Coal in the text of this volume, in
which he sought to credit Holmes with a liberal vision of judicial deference to legislative
judgments. lId at 213-45.
81. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2327 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(identifying the "kinship" of the doctrine with the substantive due process line of cases
exemplified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and arguing that both doctrines
are "potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regula-
tions"). Some state courts have also insisted that regulatory takings are a species of sub-
stantive due process. See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076, 1078 (Wash. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Fred F. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385-86 (N.Y. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
82. Indeed, no economic legislation has been invalidated on substantive due process
grounds since 1937. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTTrrIONAL LAW 472 (11th ed. 1985).
83. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 127 (1978);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Board of City Comm'rs v.
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Court promptly went out of the regulatory takings business for fifty
years. 84
When the Supreme Court finally took up the issue again in 1987,
it confined its decision to the facts. The Court in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis8 5 upheld a Pennsylvania statute, the Subsi-
dence Act, nearly identical to the Kohler Act. Focusing on a few dif-
ferences between the laws and relying on a crabbed reading of
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court reached the sensible conclusion that the
Subsidence Act did not work a taking.86 The desire to distinguish
Pennsylvania Coal may be due to the closeness of the vote, 5-4, or to
veneration for the shade of Holmes. The ability to distinguish Penn-
sylvania Coal points up the conceptual obscurity of the earlier opin-
ion. The need to distinguish it argues for the overturning of the
doctrine it called into being.
III
THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE IS AN
UNWORKABLE MUDDLE
The regulatory takings doctrine has generated a plethora of in-
consistent and open-ended formulations that have failed to make
sense of the underlying constitutional impulse. No constitutional in-
quiry has generated more complaints or satire. The Court itself read-
ily admits that its doctrine lacks coherence. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, for instance, it confessed that
it "has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action" demand compensation. 87 Rather, the Court now explains it-
self as delving into relying on "ad hoc, factual inquiries into the cir-
cumstances of each particular case,"88 relying "as much on the
exercise of judgment as on the application of logic." 89 Justice Stevens
has acknowledged that: "Even the wisest lawyers would have to ac-
Harris, 366 P.2d 710, 713 (N.M. 1961); Bacich v. Board of Control, 144 P.2d 818, 827 (Cal.
1943); Weintraub v. Flood Control Dist., 450 P.2d 714, 717 (Ariz. App. 1969); Yankee
Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1988).
84. It has been suggested that the very low profile of regulatory takings doctrine ena-
bled it to survive the overthrow of economic substantive due process. See BRUcE ACKER-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 114 (1977).
85. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
86. The Court also based its decision partly on the grounds that the Pennsylvania
Legislature had adopted the Subsidence Act to protect public safety and environmental
well-being and that the law left the coal companies with substantial amounts of valuable
coal. Id. at 485-502.
87. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
88. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986).
89. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986) (quot-
ing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).
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knowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings
jurisprudence. '"90 Scholars have been less kind, describing the regula-
tory takings area as a "muddle," 91 "a chaos of confused argument," 92
and "a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results. 93
On occasion, the Supreme Court has found that it must abandon
an innovation in constitutional law simply because the Court is unable
to develop judicially manageable standards.94 Judges must be able to
administer standards so they can consistently enforce constitutional
values without randomly invalidating laws reasonably adopted by
democratic processes. The standards ought also to give some reason-
able guidance to legislatures, lower courts, and potential litigants
about how future cases will be decided. Obviously, few constitutional
rules are so precise that judges lose all discretion or that litigants will
be able to predict accurately the outcomes of all litigation. Thus, the
suggestion that a line of constitutional decisions ought to be aban-
doned because it has failed to generate workable rules will rarely de-
serve much attention. However, when the confusion suggests some
larger impropriety infecting the doctrine, attention is warranted.
The confusion about the Takings Clause doctrine stems in the
first instance from Holmes' refusal to provide a formulation of when
land use regulations go too far.95 He insisted that every case must be
considered on its own "particular facts" and briefly sketched the fac-
tors that influenced his judgment.96 However much such reticence
suggests Holmes' jurisprudential sophistication, it has nonetheless
pointed a disastrous pathway for his less subtle descendents.
If a lawyer wished to state current takings doctrine for a legally
trained client, she would need to identify four separate clusters of
90. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
91. Rose, supra note 47, at 561.
92. ACKERMAN, supra note 84, at 8.
93. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). Other
colorful characterizations of the state of takings doctrine are collected in Jed Rubenfeld,
Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 n.2 (1993).
94. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). The
Court's appreciation that a legal problem does not generate judicially manageable stan-
dards may lead the Court to hold that such a problem is a political question, which the
Constitution commits to another branch of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962). Short of finding a political question, the absence of judicially manageable stan-
dards has persuaded the Court to conclude that it lacks authority and competence to re-
view legislation, see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955), or
administrative regulations, see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 382 (1987)
(O'Conner, J., dissenting).
95. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that the
determination of when the police power has gone too far "depends upon the particular
facts" of each case).
96. See id at 413-15.
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rule-like utterances, any one of which might be taken from the shelf to
decide a particular case. But she would also have to acknowledge the
distinct possibility that a case might be decided on some entirely dif-
ferent basis.
The oldest and most frequently invoked formulation comes from
the Penn Central case: the Court will weigh in ad hoc balance the
"character of the government action" (which seems in practice to in-
clude both the type of intrusion involved and the significance of the
public purpose being served), the economic consequences for the
owner, and the degree to which the law upsets justifiable, investment-
backed expectations. 97 Each of these factors invites the Court to en-
gage in open-ended value judgments; moreover, the weight to be af-
forded conclusions under any separate category must itself depend on
the facts of the particular case.98
But it gets worse. Two years after Penn Central, the Court held in
Agins v. City of Tiburon99 that "the application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies the owner ec-
onomically viable use of the land."' ° This inquiry seems quite differ-
ent: it requires a finding of unconstitutionality if either of two
independent criteria are met. The first criterion reintroduces to tak-
ings law the means-ends analysis familiar in due process cases, further
blurring the distinction between these constitutional doctrines. 10 The
second criterion predicates the conclusion of unconstitutionality
purely on the ground of economic loss, without regard to the need for
the regulation or the expectations of the owner, an approach later
confirmed to some extent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. 02
97. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
98. id.
99. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
100. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
101. Justice Scalia compounded this confusion with his footnote in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987), where he suggests that the Court should
require a tighter fit between means and ends in Takings Clause cases than in due process or
equal protection cases. Jerold Kayden has shown the lack of precedential support for and
sheer perversity of this assertion. Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality,
and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URn. LAW. 301, 309-31
(1991). Fortunately, lower federal and state courts have consistently ignored Scalia's
suggestion.
Nollan dealt with exaction, an owner's voluntary concession of a property right in
exchange for development permission that otherwise could have been lawfully denied.
Nicholas V. Morosoff, "'Take' My Beach Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 823, 824-25, 826 (1989). Because an exaction results in transfer of ownership to the
government or a permanent physical occupation, it raises issues analytically distinct from
regulatory takings and is not addressed in my proposal here. See supra note 7.
102. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
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The last two formulations stem from the peculiar case of Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,103 where the Court found a
taking in a city ordinance that required apartment building owners to
permit the placement of cable television wires across the building
facades.'04 The Court found a taking despite the fact that the wires
did not materially diminish and probably enhanced the value of the
buildings. 10 5 The Court reasoned that the wiring constituted a "per-
manent physical occupation" of part of the owner's property and con-
cluded that such an occupation must be condemned as a taking per
se.106
On the one hand, Loretto expresses a yearning for per se rules
that are easy to apply. Thus, the Court insists that a permanent physi-
cal occupation always constitutes a taking, without regard to its eco-
nomic impact or to the degree of inconvenience it causes. On the
other hand, the Court justifies its new rule by emphasizing its prior
holding in Kaiser Aetna v. United States that" 'the right to exclude,' so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation.' 10 7 This justification raises but cannot settle
the question of what other uses are so "fundamental" that compensa-
tion must always be provided. In attempting to answer this question,
the Court has stumbled into a thicket of natural law adjudication. 08
The doctrinal confusion recounted here is neither incidental nor
temporary. It arises from the immensity of the task that the Court has
set for itself in regulatory takings cases: to mark as a matter of princi-
ple when limitation of property use becomes unfair. Not only have
serious philosophers differed utterly in their approaches to these ques-
tions, but the trends of adjudication have changed so often over time
that observers understandably view any answers as contingent. More-
over, the Constitution itself affords no guidance, except to proscribe
outright confiscation. 109 The Court simply does not have a basis in
law, history, or consensual community standards to persuasively ex-
plain why one use restriction reflects the ordinary government adjust-
103. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
104. Id. at 441.
105. Id. at 434-35. Of course, once the fact of occupation is shown, a court should
consider the extent of the occupation as a relevant factor in determining the compensation
due. I& at 437.
106. Id. at 434, 441.
107. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
108. Within the thicket, confusion reigns. Compare Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979) (holding that the denial of the right to sell eagle feathers does not require compen-
sation) with Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that the denial of an individual's
right to transfer by descent or devise certain Indian lands requires compensation).
109. See supra part I.
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ments of conflicting interests and another violates fundamental
fairness.
IV
NO OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD PROVIDES
CONSTITUTIONAL OR GENERAL PROTECTION FOR
THE "DEVELOPMENT VALUE" OF LAND
Proponents of robust judicial enforcement of regulatory takings
tend to equate such a constitutional rule with protection of private
property per se. The merest glance at the laws of other countries with
firm commitments to the market and to private property reveals this
assertion as specious. No other nation in the world suffers under a
judicial claim of constitutional authority to determine whether any
land use regulation is too onerous. Whether in the common law juris-
dictions, European civil law jurisdictions, or the emerging nations of
Eastern Europe and Asia, the law frankly accepts the necessity of ex-
tensive government regulation of land use. Other nations award com-
pensation to owners only according to statutory standards or in cases
of outright expropriation or reversal of site-specific planning permis-
sion. The peculiar importance of constitutional judicial review in gen-
eral in the United States cannot explain the uniqueness of our
approach to regulatory takings.
I introduce first the situation in the nation whose laws most
closely resemble our own. Britain maintains a comprehensive statu-
tory system of planning control in which an owner of property must
obtain the consent of local planning authorities before engaging in
most construction or renovation. 110 The deciding agency grants or de-
nies permission based on plans and policy statements, so legal re-
course for aggrieved parties is quite limited."' Although for centuries
Britain provided compensation for public appropriations of land, it
does not require compensation for losses attributable to denial of per-
mission for new uses. 1 2 The leading scholarly authority in the field
has explained the policy:
The fundamental principle of British planning, therefore, is that no
compensation is payable to landowners for planning restrictions im-
110. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, ch. 8, § 57 (Eng.); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING 1007 (Desmond Heap ed., 1978) [hereinafter
LAW OF TOWN AND CouNRY PLANNING]. Britain's statutory system of planning dates
back to the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 51 (Eng.). LAW OF
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING, supra, at 1006. It was amended in 1951, 1953, 1954, 1959,
and 1961. Id. The current law is contained in the Town and Country Planning Act, 1990,
ch. 8 (Eng.), and subsequent partial amendments.
111. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, §§ 12, 36, 70.
112. See id. §§ 107-120 (discussing the limited circumstance under which a property
owner is granted compensation rights).
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posed on the development of their land. To that rule there are some
limited and largely anomalous exceptions, but the general idea that
the costs of regulation of new development should fall where they are
imposed has found general acceptance, largely because over a period
the market has adjusted accordingly and without causing excessive
hardship. Planning assumptions and expectations now govern land
prices, and the unpredictability of a discretionary planning system has
come to be seen as a risk inherent in land investment." 3
The British justify this approach to noncompensation on the basis
of several policy considerations that go beyond the absence of a writ-
ten constitution. British courts have declined to find a right to com-
pensation for regulatory losses even when the apparent statutory
authority exists.
In the oft-discussed decision of Belfast Corp. v. O.D. Cars Ltd. ,14
the House of Lords rejected the rationale of Pennsylvania Coal on
exemplary grounds. The appellants owned land upon which they had
operated a car repair shop for many years." 5 They applied for per-
mission to build additional garages and related buildings. 1 6 The city
corporation denied the application on the ground that its development
plan provided for other uses, namely shops and residences."17 The ap-
pellants claimed that the denial violated the relevant planning act and,
alternatively, that the planning act violated the Government of Ire-
land Act of 1920,118 which provided that the Parliament of Northern
Ireland could not "take any property without compensation."' " 9
The House of Lords upheld the denial of permission in all re-
spects. 120 Lord Radcliffe noted that British statutes and courts had
scrupulously protected the principle that: "[T]he title to property or
the enjoyment of its possession was not to be compulsorily acquired
... unless full compensation was afforded in its place.' 21 But he also
noted the nineteenth century development of "the great movement
for the regulation of life in the cities and towns in the interests of
public health and amenity."'1 22 He concluded that English law had
11-3. MALCOLM GRANT, URBAN PLANNING LAW 645 (1982). One veteran student of
British planning law has noted that the enactment of the Planning Act in 1947 introduced
the "concept (new at the time) that the ownership of land carried with it no right to de-
velop it." DESMOND HEAP, THE MARVELLOUS YEARS 214 (1992).
114. 1960 App. Cas. 490 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
115. Id. at 492.
116, Id.
117. Id. at 493.
118. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 67 (Eng.).
119. Id. § 5(1); Belfast Corp. v. O.D. Cars Ltd., 1960 App. Cas. 490, 495 (appeal taken
from N. Ir.).
120. Belfast Corp., 1960 App. Cas. at 492.
121. Id. at 523.
122. Id.
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conclusively rejected the idea that a taking included any regulation of
use.
123
A second ground for Britain's rejection of compensation for regu-
latory losses was the nation's experience under early twentieth cen-
tury planning acts. The 1932 act provided that owners could recover
for any losses in the value of their land caused by new planning re-
strictions. 124 The act also provided a logical corollary: the municipal-
ity could recover 75% of any increase in value caused by the adoption
of the planning ordinance. 25 Thus, the funds for payment for "worse-
ment" could be obtained by recapturing "betterment." In practice,
the scheme was unworkable. 126 Localities found that they could not
recover betterment, both because of severe valuation problems and
because owners had no proceeds with which to pay.127 Without funds
to pay for worsement, localities simply did not adopt plans, and Eng-
land endured a decade of suburban sprawl and ribbon develop-
ment. 28 This result contributed to the strong post-war demand for
effective planning laws with much more limited provision for
compensation. 129
The Australian Constitution requires the payment of compensa-
tion when the federal government appropriates land from private or
state ownership. 130 The Australian High Court has explicitly and re-
peatedly held, however, that the constitutional provision does not ap-
ply to regulations of property use.131 Although the statutory law of
123. Id. at 525. The absence of a general right of compensation has not led to a narrow
reading of the planning powers of a local government unit. An interesting example is
Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Minister of Hous. & Local Gov't, 1971 App. Cas. 508 (appeal
taken from Eng.), where the House of Lords found that a borough council had general
authority under the Planning Act to deny permission for development. The Lords reached
this decision even though the only reason for the denial was the desire of the council not to
pay enhanced compensation should the land be needed for road widening, in the face of a
statute prescribing a specific procedure for designating lands for future transportation
needs and requiring compensation immediately upon designation. Belfast Corp., 1960
App. Cas. at 509.
124. Town and Country Planning Act, 1993, ch. 48, § 21(1) (Eng.).
125. GRANT, supra note 113, at 21.
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 22-23. Under the 1947 Act, no compensation was payable from the imposi-
tion of development controls, except that 1947 owners could pursue a one-time claim
against a total fund of L 300 million under a distribution scheme that was to be in effect in
1953. Id. at 23. At the same time, a tax (or development charge) of 100% was imposed
upon the increase in value of land resulting from permission to develop under the Act. Id.
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951, they eliminated both the development
charge and the compensation scheme. Id. at 23-24.
130. AusTL. CONST. § 51, para. xxxi (allowing for acquisition of property on "just
terms"); see P.H. LANE, THE AUSTRALIAN CoNsTrTUToN 216-18 (1986).
131. See, e.g., Trade Practices Comm'n v. Tooth & Co., 142 C.L.R. 397 (1979) (Austl.)
(rejecting the reasoning of Pennsylvania Coal); Australia v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983)
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most states promises compensation for "injurious affection," the term
for regulatory losses bequeathed by the 1932 English Law, the rule
has been swallowed by exceptions. 132 Virtually every restriction as fa-
miliar as zoning, subdivision approval, and permit denial is exempt
from the compensation requirement. 133
Canada has no constitutional provision providing for compensa-
tion for regulatory takings. The Canadian Charter of Rights does not
protect any right of property.134 Rather, section 7 protects the rights
of everyone to "life, liberty, and security of the person."'1 35 Concern
about limiting the legislative powers of the provinces led to deletion of
property rights protection from an earlier draft. 136 Section 1(a) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights protects "the right of the individual to ...
enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof ex-
cept by due process of law.' 37 But the courts have not read this pro-
vision as imposing any substantive limit on the authority of Parliament
to expropriate or regulate without compensation. Professor Hagman
summarized the Canadian law as follows:
Canada provides little grist for one looking for precedent for generous
compensation for damages for mere regulation. The Canadian courts
are not wont in this environmental age to save landowners from harsh
land-use controls, let alone order that some compensation be paid ab-
sent some statutory base for doing so.138
In the civil law countries of Europe, compensating landowners
for the cost of regulation finds even less support. Professor Glendon
has noted that, for Europeans, it is nearly unthinkable to treat prop-
(Austl.), available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, AUSCAS File ("[Tjhe extinction or the
limitation of property rights does not amount to acquisition.... Unless the Commonwealth
gains some property from the State or person, there is no acquisition."); Australia v. Tas-
mania, 158 C.L.R. at 1 (Murphy, J.) (stating that the limitation in § 51, paragraph xxxi of
the Constitution "has not been thought hitherto to apply to a regulatory law that did not
affect an acquisition of property"); Australia v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. at 1 (Brennan, J.)
(stating that laws "which merely prohibit or control a particular use ... plainly do not
constitute an 'acquisition' ").
New Zealand also appears to have rejected the concept of a regulatory taking. See
Luoni v. Minister of Works & Dev., [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 62, 65.
132. A.S. FOGG, AUSTRALIAN TOWN PLANNING LAW: UNIFORMITY AND CHANGE 425-
88 (1982); Donald G. Hagman, Compensable Regulation, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 280-81 (1978) [hereinafter WINDFALLS FOR
WI'EOUTS] (stating that "compensation provisions have been emasculated in Australia by
the courts and legislatures").
133. See Fooo, supra note 132, at 445-59.
134. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
135. Id. § 7.
136. ERIC C.E. TODD, THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION IN CANADA
32-33 (2d ed. 1992).
137. Id. at 34.
138. Hagnan, supra note 132, at 280-81.
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erty as a basic human right.139 Such a disposition runs deeply in Euro-
pean legal culture. The French Civil Code defines ownership
(propri6t6) as "the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most
absolute manner, provided that they are not put to a use prohibited by
statutes or by regulations."' 1 The concept of property, having been
created by law, must be bound by the law.
Germany has a robust real estate market despite what property
rights advocates might fear. German law does not treat property
rights as pre-political entitlements sheltered from restraint. Thus, the
German Civil Code permits an owner to use his property as he pleases
"to the extent that it is not contrary to the law or the rights of third
parties.' 141 Likewise, the German Basic Law (i.e., Constitution) guar-
antees property rights, but also insists that such rights should serve the
common good. The Basic Law provides that statutes shall determine
the "content and limits" of property rights.142 Moreover, the Basic
Law imposes a public duty on property, proclaiming that its use
should serve the public welfare. 143 In the German legal system, there-
fore, restrictions on property use, however severe, do not violate fun-
damental legal understandings about the nature of property rights or
the constitutional rights of ownership.
In limited circumstances, German land use statutes do provide
for compensation when losses are due to use restrictions. 1'" The
framework statute is a federal law, the Baugesetzbuch, which regulates
how localities develop plans and adopt land use regulations. 45 The
law provides for compensation for some planning losses. The poten-
tially broadest ground is given in BauGB section 42, which facially
requires compensation for any substantial diminution in property
value caused by a locality's adoption of a new comprehensive zoning
ordinance. 46 This provision makes it possible for an owner to obtain
139. Mary A. Glendon, Rights and Responsibilities Viewed from Afar: The Case of Wel-
fare Rights, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNrrY, Spring 1994, at 33.
140. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 554 (Fr.).
141. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 903 (F.R.G.).
142. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 14 (F.R.G.) provides:
1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits
shall be determined by the laws.
2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be effected
only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature and extent of
compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equita-
ble balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In
case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to
the ordinary courts.
143. Id.
144. See Katharina Richter, Compensable Regulation in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 5 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 34, 35-36 (1988).
145. Id. at 38-39.
146. Id. at 58.
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compensation for the lost development value of land, but then seri-
ously limits when it will be paid. Compensation is available only
when: (1) the municipality has improved the land by providing infra-
structure, (2) the landowner requested a building permit to which he
was legally entitled except for the change in use restrictions, (3) the
owner actually intended and had the financial resources to undertake
the proposed development, (4) the landowner had been entitled to
build for less than seven years, and (5) the proposed development
must be compatible with a safe and healthy environment. 147 Given
the breadth of these exceptions, it is not surprising that localities pay
little compensation for planning changes. 48
Both the English and German compensation provisions seem
designed primarily to allow a developer to rely on governmental per-
mission to undertake a particular project. In England, development
permission must be explicitly granted. In Germany, the owner of im-
proved land may undertake ordinary forms of development permitted
by zoning ordinances less than seven years old, but the extensive and
professional planning process that precedes German zoning gives its
map greater finality than would seem reasonable in most American
jurisdictions. These rules appear to be measured attempts to lessen
the risks of planning loss in systems that presuppose few limits on the
initial decision of what use may be permitted on any parcel.
V
FEDERAL COURT ENFORCEMENT OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS
DOCTRINE AGAINST THE STATES UPSETS APPROPRIATE NOTIONS
OF FEDERALISM
As adopted, the Fifth Amendment posed no problem of federal-
ism. It prohibited the federal government from appropriating land
and other resources from citizens for a public purpose without paying
compensation. An extension of the Takings Clause's prohibition to
permanent occupation similarly did not abridge the power of a
state. 49 However, the incorporation of the Takings Clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment obviously limits the authority of the states to
appropriate or permanently occupy property. 50 This is no small con-
straint on the states' discretion, but does not intrude on their basic
lawmaking function; expropriation does not change any legal rules but
147. Id. at 58-60.
148. See id at 63 nn.110-11.
149. See supra notes 44-46 (discussing the Supreme Court's extension of the Takings
Clause to permanent, physical invasions of property in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 166 (1872)).
150. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
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merely transfers assets to the state. However, the application of the
regulatory takings doctrine to the states impairs their authority to ad-
just the limits of property interests created by the states themselves.
Such interference by federal courts in a traditional state function sug-
gests, at the very least, the need for a stronger justification for the
exercise of national power.
Property makes an anomalous constitutional right. Unlike rights
to freedom of speech or due process of law, federal courts do not have
authority to elaborate the meaning and dimensions of property.
Rather, as the Supreme Court has often reiterated: "Property interests
... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules and understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law."'151 The Constitu-
tion does not embody any natural law of property rights. In exerting
the power to nullify land use regulations, the Supreme Court has
taken upon itself an authority to insist on the natural form of a prop-
erty right that the Constitution does not confer.
We are accustomed to thinking in legal categories. A fee simple
estate in Blackacre is a property interest under which the owner exer-
cises wide dominion over the land.152 On the other hand, a statute or
regulation prohibiting open-air burning is a use regulation that con-
strains the uses that the property owner may enjoy. Lawyers are wont
to think of the former simply as a species of private law and the latter
as an instance of public law. But from a historical and logical-rather
than legal-perspective, such a distinction makes no sense. In fact,
the burning ordinance actually changed the definition of the fee sim-
ple in this jurisdiction.
Theoretically, the legislature could have restricted use by enact-
ing a statute amending the meaning of a fee simple. Instead, it en-
acted a different kind of statute, one that put the prohibition on
burning in another section of the state code or that delegated the au-
thority to regulate burning to a locality or special administrative of-
fice. The effect on the owner under state law would be identical in
any case.
Thus, the regulatory takings doctrine effectively shrinks the
state's control over its own property law. The legal consequence of an
appropriation highlights this effect. When the state exercises eminent
domain, it does not change property law, but extinguishes one owner's
151. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))).
152. See, e.g., OLIN L. BROWDER JR. ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 233 (4th ed. 1984)
(stating that a fee simple in Blackacre gives the owner the right to possess, to use, to enjoy,
and to exploit a given piece of land).
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property fights and transfers the resource to itself. 153 Requiring com-
pensation to each expropriated party does not limit the state's ability
to define property law except in the obvious narrow sense that the
state cannot assume the authority to terminate individual interests
without compensation. 154
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council155 illustrates the damage
that results from this judicial intrusion into state property law. Lucas
would require compensation whenever a land use regulation deprives
an owner of all economic use unless the regulation duplicates a provi-
sion of nuisance law or of some other state common law property doc-
trine.156 Such a rule reverses the majoritarian premise of every state's
constitution, namely, that legislation supersedes common law rules. 157
In no other area of law does the federal Constitution subordinate state
legislation to the common law and require the former to duplicate the
latter.
Even worse, the Supreme Court has chosen perhaps the worst
area within which to impose such a requirement. The vagueness of
nuisance law requires courts to make loosely guided policy judgments
about the comparative harms and benefits of competing uses of
land. 158 Litigation may begin only after the use has begun and the
harm felt. 159 Such a proceeding may be indispensable to accommo-
dating conflicting uses between neighbors, but courts deal poorly with
cases where a defendant's use injures many people, though no one
individual seriously enough to give that individual an incentive to
bring suit. 60 Moreover, judges lack the expertise to effectively ad-
153. See Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924) (stating that "ordina-
rily an unqualified taking in fee by eminent domain takes all interests and as it takes the
res is not called open to specify the interest that happens to exist"); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTy § 565 cnt. d (1944) (stating that in a condemnation of land, the thing
that is being condemned is the aggregate of rights that go to make up the ownership of the
land).
154. As Justice Scalia explicitly stated: "A law or decree with such an effect [i.e.,
prohibiting all economically beneficial activity] must ... do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners ... or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances." Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). Justice Scalia instructed that evaluation of
this question on remand would be a matter of state common law. See id. at 2901; cf. Mil-
waukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that enactment of the Clean Water Act
eliminated the basis for the federal law of nuisance for pollution of interstate waters).
155. 112 S. Ct. at 2886-2926.
156. Id. at 2901-02.
157. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S.
71, 89 (1928) ("A state may freely alter, amend, or abolish the common law within its
jurisdiction.").
158. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Boomer Thenty Years Later: An Introduction, with Some
Footnotes About "Theory", 54 ALB. L. REv. 171, 176-78 (1990).
159. See id. at 178-79 (stating that nuisance law is remedial in nature).
160. Rational individuals will not pursue even meritorious legal claims if their ex-
pected recovery is less than the attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses in-
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dress pervasive, scientifically complex harms to the public within the
context of private litigation. 161
The difficulty of adjudicating instances of nuisance led the states
in the early years of this century to adopt legislative and administra-
tive control mechanisms to deal with land use and environmental
problems.162 These mechanisms allow use preferences to be deter-
mined through democratic processes and applied prospectively in light
of expert assessment.
One result of this shift to statute was that nuisance law atrophied.
One historian of nuisance observed:
[N]uisance law could not adequately respond to the problems of air
and water pollution. Information, procedural, and financial barriers
would preclude many affected parties from bringing nuisance suits
against pervasive nuisances with widespread impact on the general
public health and welfare .... Due to its inherent limitations, nuisance
law generally has been relegated to marginal cases, involving small-
scale, localized land use conflicts. 163
volved.... That can result in an inefficient allocation of resources when an injurer
inefficiently continues to impose relatively small external costs on a large number
of potential praintiffs, none of whom has sufficient incentive to invest the time
and resources necessary to bring a lawsuit.
DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS
288 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 570 (4th ed. 1992); Peter
S. Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives To Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 41, 41-42 (1983).
The doctrine of public nuisance, which permits suit to vindicate common public inter-
ests, has generally been restricted (ironically) to suits for violation of criminal statutes and
common law crimes. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 90, at 645-46 (5th ed. 1984). In the early years of legal activism to protect the
environment, there were hopes that the lumpy and narrow doctrine of public nuisance
could be refurbished to provide a vehicle for common law suits to protect environmental
values not protected by statute. See, e.g., John E. Bryson & Angus MacBeth, Public Nui-
sance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241,
275-81 (1972). But judicial reluctance, see United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137
(E.D. Va. 1979), and the dynamic pace of environmental legislation, see Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), have rendered such promise unfulfilled.
161. Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,412 (1976); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
162. Modem land use regulation dates from the adoption of comprehensive zoning
ordinances, beginning with New York City in 1916. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIEN C.
JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 20 (2d ed.
1986). Earlier land use regulations addressed specific problems, frequently by declaring a
particular use to be a public nuisance. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140 (1894).
Still, the move to comprehensive zoning ordinances, with their utilization of administrative
mechanisms and professional planning, represents a fundamental shift from reliance upon
individual common law litigation. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social
Change and Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967) (analyzing the shift
in addressing employee accidents from tort litigation under various employer-protective
doctrines to workers' compensation systems).
163. Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 229-30 (1990).
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Until Lucas, courts and scholars had generally considered nuisance to
be marginalized. In the most widely studied modem case,164 for ex-
ample, the court refused to apply nuisance law to enjoin injurious air
pollution but deferred to the legislature. The court reasoned that the
legislature was better equipped than the judiciary to balance the costs
and benefits of differing rules for society as a whole in light of avail-
able scientific evidence. 165 As the authors of a leading casebook con-
clude bluntly: "[N]uisance litigation is ill-suited to other than small
scale, incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution
problems."' 166
Thus, the Lucas Court upset the state allocation of lawmaking
function, whether understood as a matter of state constitutional law or
as a pragmatic legal response to the harms of pollution. Now, when
the Court employs the Takings Clause to strike down state regulations
under Lucas, it deprives the state of its basic power to define property
rights.
VI
CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF PROPERTY INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST ARE A
CONTINUOUS AND APPROPRIATE FEATURE OF AMERICAN LAW THAT
OUGHT NOT RAISE SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Property does provide security to the owners of resources, al-
lowing them to profit in the future from prudent investment and con-
servation decisions today. This security has permitted private gains
and made possible broad public benefits, such as the increase in aggre-
gate material welfare and the broad diffusion of economic decision-
making. But property rights have continuously evolved to accord with
social conceptions of public welfare.
In general, the law recognizes as "property" those interests that
promote the ends favored by the lawmakers. Though such interests
may incidentally be valuable to owners, they will perish if in conflict
with sufficiently powerful interests of the community at large. This
dynamic lies behind Justice Jackson's statement that: "[N]ot all eco-
nomic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages
are 'rights' which have the law back of them, and only when they are
so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfering
with them or to compensate for their invasion."'1 67 In other words,
164. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
165. Id. at 871.
166. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 987 (3d ed. 1993).
167. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
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only when the law secures the cooperation of others in respecting an
interest in a resource is there a property right in that thing.168
Accordingly, the property rights recognized by law have changed
over time with the economic needs, cultural understandings, and polit-
ical arrangements of succeeding generations. Among other changes,
professor Sax has recently noted:
In eighteenth century America, the states abolished feudal tenures,
abrogated primogeniture and entails, ended imprisonment for debt,
and significantly reduced rights of alienation, as well as dower and
curtesy. In the nineteenth century, to promote industrialization by hy-
dropower mills, courts redefined the traditional rights of natural flow
in a water established during a preindustrial economy .... In the arid
west, landowners' riparian rights were simply abolished because they
were unsuited to the physical conditions of the area. As the status of
women changed, laws abolished husbands' property rights in their
wives' estates.169
The emancipation of the slaves, arguably the most significant stroke of
public policy in our history, terminated property rights without com-
pensation. Although many schemes for emancipation before the Civil
War had included compensation for slave owners and Congress' first
statutory emancipation (for the District of Columbia) had provided
compensation, the growing commitment to freedom bred during the
bloody struggle made respect for the property rights of even Union-
loyal slaveholders appear incoherent by 1865.170
Emancipation provides a vivid example of the necessary process
of accommodation between social needs and property rules and the
potentially disastrous effects of aggressive application of the Takings
Clause.' 7' Property is not a characteristic imminent in some determi-
nate set of similar phenomena. Rather, calling an asset "property"
168. See Daniel Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradic-
tion, 17 VT. L. REv. 647, 647-57 (1993).
169. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1448 (1993) (footnotes omitted);
MORTON J. HOROwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 31-62, 1789-1860
(1977).
170. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 6, 74 (1988). In 1862, President Lincoln lobbied for compensated emancipation,
but he abandoned the idea in April 1865. Id. at 6-7. Common law decisions also cut down
dramatically on the scope of property rights to further perceived important social goals.
For example, courts reduced the protection of ownership by developing the doctrine that a
person who obtains possession of an owner's goods by fraud can convey to a good faith
purchaser for value title superior to that of the original owner. The rule protected market
exchanges after distribution of goods expanded beyond local interchange. See GRAr GiL-
MORE, THE COMMERCIAL DocrRE OF GOOD FAITH PURCHASE 1057 (1954). Obviously,
the state did not compensate owners for losses suffered in reliance upon the older rule.
171. Indeed, the recent expansion of takings prohibitions seems designed to prevent
the evolution of property law toward redefinitions of rights to protect broad ecological
understandings. See infra part X.
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merely indicates that the law will protect the owner's interest in the
asset against adverse claims. The set of interests so protected is quite
heterogeneous and dynamic. The choice of which interests to protect
at any one time reflects contemporary social values acting upon re-
ceived tradition.
Evolution in values and needs reshapes the set of interests so pro-
tected without casting doubt on the continuing commitment to the
idea of property.172 The landlord's power to evict the tenant at the
end of the lease term may wane; 73 at the same time, the right of a
celebrity to exploit her public image waxes.174 To the extent that
strong enforcement of the regulatory takings doctrine succeeds, ironi-
cally, it deprives the institution of property of its strong utilitarian
support.
The regulatory takings doctrine protects those individuals who
wish to preserve a particular property right. But this desire remains
unfulfilled in the long run. If one regulation does not reshape a prop-
erty right, another regulation or a common law decision will. More-
over, the great breadth of the doctrine leads inevitably to inconsistent
results; the courts end up declaring that they cherish some property
rights but are indifferent to others.175 But inexplicable, inconsistent
results weaken the doctrine. Thus, invocation of the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine will be not only wrong but ultimately futile.
VII
THE RECENT CONSERVATIVE DEPARTURES IN REGULATORY TAKINGS
DOCTRINE REFLECT AN ILLEGITIMATE ATTEMPT TO EMPLOY THE
CONSTITUTION TO ROLL BACK ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Expansive interpretation of the regulatory takings doctrine has
become the focal point of efforts by a school of conservative jurists
and political activists to undermine the constitutional foundations of
172. Professor Carol Rose has described an analogous movement in property law: an
oscillation between "crystal rules," promoting, ex ante, efficient market transactions, and
"mud rules," permitting courts to accomplish equity post hoc. Carol Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
173. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687,701 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (barring retaliatory evic-
tion); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (declaring that a tenant can
be evicted at the end of a term only for good cause).
174. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (holding that a
television model can sue a firm for converting her "marketable celebrity identity value" by
using a robot that resembled her in an advertisement).
175. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding
that the application of the Beachfront Management Act constitutes a taking of plaintiff's
undeveloped lots) with Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (holding that the city's refusal to grant a permit to build a 50-story office tower atop
Grand Central Station under a landmark preservation law is not a taking).
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the regulatory state. The push to protect property rights has spawned
both judicial innovation and legislative campaigns. In my view, the
underlying rationale for these endeavors is unpersuasive. The judicial
intervention is illegitimate, and the lobbying effort legitimate but
wrongheaded.
To begin, an embarrassing inconsistency is obvious in judges who
give expansive readings to the Takings Clause but otherwise denounce
judicial protections of liberty interests as naked judicial activism. The
epitome of this hypocrisy is volume 112 of the Supreme Court Re-
porter, where Providence has juxtaposed Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'76 with his dis-
sent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.177 In the dissent, Justice Scalia
complains bitterly about the retention of constitutional protection for
a woman's right to have an abortion by condemning the activism of an
"Imperial Judiciary" 178 based on "philosophic predilection and moral
intuition."'1 79 The thrust of his dissent is that questions of public pol-
icy not settled by the text and "tradition" of the Constitution must
find their answers in the political arena.' 80 This is, of course, a famil-
iar argument that dates back to conservative opposition to the Warren
Court 81 and to liberal opposition to the regime of substantive due
process.'8 Justice Scalia's contributions to this constitutional tradi-
tion are among the most vigorous and intelligent.
But where is this restraint when Justice Scalia regards South Car-
olina's attempt to reduce economic and environmental losses due to
beachfront erosion and flooding? Lucas establishes, without apparent
grounding in the Constitution, the new per se rule that a regulation
works a taking, regardless of the severity of the harm it seeks to pre-
vent, if it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of his
property. 83 A single exception provides that no taking occurs if the
regulation enforces a use limitation inherent in the property, such as
through nuisance law.' 4 Scalia describes this as a "long established"
principle, even though none of the cases he cites in support of it actu-
176. 112 S. Ct, 2886 (1992).
177. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
178. Id. at 2882 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
182. See First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 334 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73-74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
183. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 (1992).
Justice Scalia labeled this rule the "total takings" inquiry. it at 2901.
184. l& at 2901-02.
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ally so held.'85 The opinion dismisses the long contrary line following
Mugler as "the Court's early attempt."'1 86
The opinion also draws the astonishing distinction between per-
sonal and real property. An owner of personal property, "by reason
of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings, ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulations
might even render his property economically worthless."' 1 7 For own-
ers of land, however, such arguments are "inconsistent with the histor-
ical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture."'8 However, not only does the "historical
compact" not address use restrictions, it makes no discernible distinc-
tion between personal and real property. Moreover, the "constitu-
tional tradition" extolled consists largely of poorly considered dicta:
Lucas plainly engages in constitutional innovation to further the jus-
tices' political preferences.
Lucas may be seen in retrospect as the high water mark of consti-
tutional property rights inflation. Justices Kennedy and Souter de-
clined to join the opinion, 8 9 and in the subsequent case of Concrete
Pipe & Products of California Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California,90 the Court returned to its traditional
reluctance to displace legislative burdens.' 91 In the recent decision of
Dolan v. City of Tigard,92 in which the Court held that a city's re-
quirement that an owner dedicate a strip of land for a greenway as a
condition for approval of a construction project violated the Takings
Clause, 193 a bare majority joined the Chief Justice's opinion. 194 More-
over, that opinion emphatically affirmed the importance of local land
use regulation. Finally, President Clinton's appointees to the Court
185. All of the decisions cited by Scalia upheld land use regulations except Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, which found a taking on quite different grounds. See id. at
2893-94 n.6.
186. Id. at 2897-98. These cases rather hold that regulations on use that satisfy the Due
Process Clause do not raise takings concerns. Under the Due Process Clause, the appro-
priate inquiry is whether the legislature has prohibited conduct that reasonably could be
believed to contribute substantially to a public evil; there is no direct concern with the
utility to the actor of the prohibited conduct. For a discussion of these cases, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-45.
187. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-900. Justice Scalia cites here Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51 (1979), a decision that he has unsuccessfully sought to overrule or limit. See, e.g., Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
188. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
189. See id. at 2888, 2902-04, 2925-26.
190. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
191. Id. at 2289-92.
192. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
193. Id. at 2321-22.
194. Id. at 2310.
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are most unlikely to find regulatory takings to be a comfortable vehi-
cle for judicial activism. 195
Of more immediate concern are recent decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Fed-
eral Claims, where the courts have found takings in denials of permits
by the Army Corps of Engineers to fill wetlands. 196 These decisions
have had a peculiarly strong influence for two reasons. First, these
courts were created only in 1982,197 and until very recently all the ap-
pointments had been nominated by Republican presidents; thus, these
courts are more likely than other federal courts to be receptive to tak-
ings claims.' 98 Second, the Supreme Court's clear indications that
plaintiffs can press claims (in excess of $10,000) against the federal
government for regulatory takings only through actions for compensa-
tion under the Tacker Act' 99 have given the Claims Court and the
Federal Circuit exclusive federal jurisdiction over such cases.200 Thus,
decisions of these courts will be controlling de facto in the federal sys-
tem until reviewed by the Supreme Court.
195. Justice Ginsburg dissented in Dolan. Id. at 2322. Justice Breyer's views on tak-
ings remain elusive. He has not sat with the Court to hear a takings case, and during his
confirmation he successfully sidestepped directly addressing his views on the subject. See
Tony Mauro, Stability Amid Departures and Arrivals, THE RECORDER, Aug. 26, 1994, at 3;
Nancy E. Roman, Breyer To Sever Ties to Lloyd;- Hearings Begin for Court Nominee,
WASH. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at Al.
196. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988);
Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548 (1989).
197. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 171(a), 127,
96 Stat. 25, 27, 36-39.
198. Clint Bolick, a Washington conservative activist, was quoted in the National
Journal:
The Claims Court is a place where the Reagan and Bush Administrations have
been able to place top-notch conservative judges without getting much attention.
That is the result of liberals being somewhat asleep at the switch and the Admin-
istrations being extremely sophisticated in their selection and placement of
judges.
W. John Moore, Just Compensation, NAT'L Jujusr, June 13, 1992, at 1404, 1406.
When the United States Claims Court was created out of the United States Court of
Claims in 1982, the 16 active Commissioners of the Court of Claims automatically became
article I judges of the Claims Court; their terms extended to no later than October 1, 1986
unless the President reappointed them. § 167, 96 Stat. at 50. The name of the court was
changed again to the Court of Federal Claims. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902(b), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
199. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Thomas Hanley, A Developer's Dream:
The United States Claims Court's Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C.
ENvTL. AiF. L. REv. 317, 324 (1991). Parties may appeal Court of Federal Claims deci-
sions to the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over every such appeal. 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993); Hanley, supra, at 325.
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These decisions have frequently been excoriated-and properly
so.201 First, they brandish a wilful ignorance of the ecological value of
wetlands,2o2 even going so far as to reject the premise of Congress'
grant of permit authority to the Army Corps of Engineers: that
preventing destruction of wetlands substantially advances the public
interest in water quality.203 Moreover, several decisions have manipu-
lated the doctrinal ambiguities in the measurement of a property
owner's regulated property to exaggerate his losses.204
In the executive branch, President Reagan's Executive Order No.
12,630, issued in 1988, reveals the objectives of the property rights ac-
tivists. 20 5 The order instructs agencies to assess the effect of proposed
actions on constitutionally protected property rights. 20 6 Such assess-
ments are unlikely to generate much useful guidance, given the
Supreme Court's repeated insistence that takings claims can be evalu-
ated only in concrete applications to particular properties and upon a
fully developed factual record.207 This order would amount to no
more than a bit of harmless symbolism were it not for the highly parti-
san account of regulatory takings doctrine that the Executive order
directs agencies to apply.
201. See John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting
Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CArH. U. L. REv. 771,
785-805 (1993); Hanley, supra note 200, at 324-26, 333-53; Glenn Sugameli, Takings Issues
in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury
Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENvTL. LJ. 439, 487-89 (1993).
202. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 C. Ct. 160, 171 (1985), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) ("[Slimple
invocation of the term pollution cannot foreclose a plaintiff's right .... Mere labels' of
this sort afford 'no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.' "); Florida Rock
Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053
(1987) ("[Tlhe concern of the district engineer is almost exclusively the continued exist-
ence of the wetlands, not ... pollution.... Denial of the [mining] permit requires it to
maintain... a facility, the wetlands, which by presently received wisdom operates for the
public good .... This ... reveals a private interest ... deserving of compensation.");
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 389 (1988) (stating that the "pollu-
tion caused by the plaintiff ... cannot be considered harmful since the possible pollution
•.. is merely incidental to any human action undertaken").
203. See Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388-90.
204. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 168-74 (1990). The
Court of Federal Claims has also granted relief to plaintiffs who purchased land knowing
that a wetlands fill permit could be withheld, thus making a mockery of the frequent state-
ments that regulatory takings law protects reasonable investment-backed expectations re-
garding the freedom to develop. See Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 557-59
(1989).
205. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
206. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859.
207. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 2, 8-11 (1988).
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The Executive order and its implementing guidelines 208 present a
more restrictive reading of the Takings Clause than does the Supreme
Court's opinions. While the Court looks two ways, occasionally incor-
porating means-ends analysis from due process jurisprudence into
some takings decisions, 209 the order stares resolutely in the direction
of compensation. For example, although the Court has not clearly ar-
ticulated whether the law must rationally or substantially advance the
public interest, the guidelines firmly conclude that the agency action
must "substantially advance" the purpose, announcing that: "[Ijt is not
enough that the policy or action rationally advance the purpose pur-
ported to be served. ' 210 To take another example, the order also re-
solves the open issue of the size of the property interest diminished by
a regulation in favor of each "separate and distinct interest" within a
holding.211 The examples of this doctrinal distortion are far less signif-
icant than the fact of the attempt. The order's dramatic expansion of
constitutional protection for property interests puts into effect a cen-
tral goal of a school of conservative legal activists driven by ideologi-
cal passion.212
These activists have now turned their efforts toward passing vari-
ous species of property rights legislation. Advocating generous statu-
tory compensation for regulatory losses is, of course, a constitutionally
legitimate project, but the legislation proposed is misguided for a host
of reasons. What remains most disturbing about the legislative advo-
cacy is the asserted rationale of securing constitutionally protected
property rights.213 Many of the bills have sought to give a legislative
base to the Executive order and its bogus takings doctrine.214 Others
go beyond the order in mandating compensation whenever legislation
reduces the market value of the "affected portion" of a property by as
208. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUA-
TION OF RISK AND AVOIDANCE OF UNANTICIPATED TAKINGS (1988), reprinted in [1988
Admin. Materials] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,168 [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
209. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
210. GUIDELINES, supra note 208, at 35,172.
211. 53 Fed. Reg. 8861.
212. Charles Fried, the Solicitor General at the time, noted in his memoirs:
Attorney General Meese and his young advisors-many drawn from the ranks of
the fledgling Federalist Society and other devotees of the extreme libertarian
views of Chicago Law Professor Richard Epstein-had a specific, aggressive, and
it seemed to be, quite radical project in mind: to use the takings clause of the fifth
amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and
property. The grand plan was to make government pay for a taking every time its
regulations impinged too severely on a property right. If the government labored
under so severe an obligation there would be, to say the least, much less
regulation.
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 193 (1991).
213. See Letter from 126 American Law School Professors to Members of the United
States Congress (June 29, 1994) (on file with the Ecology Law Quarterly).
214. See H.R. 561,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 130, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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little as 20%.215 Such compensation would exceed that guaranteed by
the Constitution by even more than does enforcement of the current
judicial takings doctrine.
Some consideration of the approach of professor Richard Ep-
stein, both the ablest and most influential proponent of constitutional
property rights, may help illuminate the constitutional underpinnings
of this new judicial activism. A basic premise of Epstein's approach is
a wide-ranging contempt for the political process. Epstein views the
Takings Clause
[a]s part of a comprehensive effort to discipline the excesses of gov-
ernment by demanding that it pay when it takes private property for
general public purposes. In so doing, the Clause forces government
officials to put their money where their mouth is when they assert that
certain social gains are worth the private costs that they impose.216
Even authors sympathetic to Epstein's political preferences have re-
jected his theory due to its failure to consider the distribution of con-
stitutional authority.217 Epstein's preferred approach would eliminate
the presumption of validity that the Constitution affords the demo-
cratic political process. He would thus make payment-rather than
representation and procedural regularity-the criterion for legiti-
macy. Whatever the merits of Epstein's views as matters of philo-
sophic speculation or political mobilization, they depart so profoundly
from constitutional tradition that enacting these views through inter-
pretation of the Takings Clause would greatly imperil the institutional
role of the federal courts. The courts would be sharply constricting
the scope of democratic self-government without the cover of consti-
tutional text or tradition.
VIII
THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE DOES NOT
ADVANCE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The mere fact that government action imposes losses on a prop-
erty owner does not justify compensation on economic grounds alone.
If the government puts the property to a higher value use than the
215. See Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
bill has now been referred to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. See
S. 3603, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See generally infra notes 277-287.
216. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 44
(citations omitted).
217: See, e.g., Thomas A. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle; Essay
on Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561,
1564-69 (1986). Epstein's book, Takings, received an unusually thorough drubbing from
academic critics. See idt at 1561; Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 279 (1986)
[hereinafter Sax, Takings]; Mark Kelnan, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists,
74 CAL. L. REv. 1829 (1986); Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 21 (1986); Thomas Ross, Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1591 (1986).
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private owner would, then compensating the owner reduces aggregate
efficiency, ceteris paribus. Apart from this simple point, there seem to
be two types of arguments concerning whether compensation for tak-
ings promotes efficiency. The first focuses on how compensation af-
fects the incentives of individual landowners, asking whether
compensation keeps such takings from unduly discouraging valuable
investments in land. The second focuses on the legislature or other
regulator, asking whether a compensation requirement curbs a ten-
dency to pursue projects without substantial public benefit.
The incentive effects of appropriation on owners have drawn a
great deal of attention.218 Some theorists have expressed concern that
uncompensated takings will discourage owners, so that they will invest
too little in wealth-creating enterprises.219 In other words, if owners
believe that government seizure will prevent them from reaping what
they sow, they will not sow in the first place.220 To some extent this
must be true, as demonstrated by the adoption of antiexpropriation
clauses in formerly socialist countries to encourage foreign
investment. 221
Closer examination reveals serious doubts about the incentive ef-
fects of appropriation. The risk of loss from government action re-
sembles many other risks that investors face and mitigate through
insurance, such as the threat of fire.222 Thus, the proponent of com-
pensation must show some special feature of appropriation that justi-
fies government compensation, since we typically leave it to owners to
insure their property through the market. Although theorists have at-
tempted to show that reliance on private insurance for takings faces
insuperable obstacles,223 their efforts have not held the field. It may
be that insurance would increase the probability of appropriation, be-
cause owners who have privately contracted for compensation have
less incentive to resist appropriation through the political process.
But this problem of "moral hazard" is endemic to insurance in gen-
218. My understanding of these issues owes a large debt to Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992), a lucid critique of the
literature.
219. Id. at 280-81.
220. See William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman,
Comments on Economic Interpretation of Just Compensation, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269
(1988).
221. RUSSIAN FED. CONST. (1993) art. 35, § 3; REP. OF ESTONIA CONST. (1992) ch. 2,
art. 31.
222. For further discussion, see POSNER, supra note 160, at 58 (explaining that the risk
of a government taking is far less than the risk of loss due to earthquakes (which is readily
insurable) and that insurance is available against expropriation of property by foreign
governments).
223. See generally Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings,
an Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. Rv. 569 (1984).
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eral.224 Moreover, the problem already exists under the Just Compen-
sation Clause, which guarantees compensation for outright
appropriation.225 It would be better addressed by outlawing compen-
sation in all cases.22 6
A cost of mandating compensation as compared with relying on
market insurance is that compensation imposes costs on all taxpayers,
who must pay the award.227 If private insurance were the norm, many
citizens would decline to buy it since they might either own little or no
property or own so much property that the loss of a little could be
easily borne. In particular, substantial business enterprises with di-
verse holdings might rarely seek outside insurance. 22s Socializing
these risks requires these parties to purchase (through taxes) insur-
ance that they rationally would have concluded was not in their
interests.
Mandated compensation may also encourage overinvestment in
wasteful uses of property. Such wasteful investment may occur, for
example, when an owner develops property that she anticipates may
be taken soon for a road or park, discounting prospective capital
losses by expected "just compensation. ' '229 Such perverse incentives
reach grotesque proportion under recently proposed regulatory com-
pensation legislation, which encourages landowners to propose illegal
and environmentally destructive uses of their property, such as filling
in prime wetlands, so that they can be paid for losses stemming from
government prohibitions. Thus, consideration of both the doubtful
benefits and the real costs of mandated compensation leads to the
conclusion that eliminating the compensation requirement would not
reduce owners' incentive for productive use to an extent that would
harm overall welfare.
In today's ideological wars, the argument that a compensation re-
quirement reins in the lust of government to transfer wealth waste-
fully is even more common-but is equally flawed. The argument
224. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509,
537 (1986) (noting that to "the extent that insurance covers losses, actors have less incen-
tive to avoid them"); Farber, supra note 218, at 284.
225. See supra part I.
226. See Kaplow, supra note 224, at 532 n.61 (stating that the "notion that a high ex-
pectation of loss supports the need for compensation seems counterintuitive from many
perspectives, and if private incentives are taken into account the notion seems, if anything,
backwards").
227. See Farber, supra note 218, at 282-83.
228. Kaplow, supra note 224, at 603 (stating that for "firms that have diversified owner-
ship, special insurance for takings may be unnecessary").
229. The common law terminates several species of property rights, such as servitudes,
when they become economically wasteful over time. But see Richard A. Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1364 (1982)
(arguing that servitudes should not be defeasible due to changed conditions).
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supposes that having to pay for the losses caused by regulation will
limit a legislature to those projects that actually increase overall wel-
fare.230 But professor Farber has convincingly shown that, even as-
suming that individual legislators invariably act mean-spiritedly in
their own interest, this argument is nonsensical.231 A legislator who
supports an appropriation of property in order to satisfy some special
interest should welcome the requirement of compensation because
such a payoff will blunt the ferocious opposition of the property
owner and those who fear similar large losses.232 Property owners'
opposition will often be more difficult for the legislator to face than
the muted concerns of taxpayers who would absorb the diffused costs
of compensating the property owners.233 Professor Farber concludes:
"Assuming that the dispossessed will usually be a stronger political
force than the alternative cost-bearers, a compensation requirement
will lead to more rent-seeking (pork barrel) projects than an anti-com-
pensation rule. '234
Finally, any merits the arguments for compensation may have
disappear when we turn from appropriation to regulation. Even Rich-
ard Posner argues that losses caused by the redefinition of property
rights should not be compensated. 235 He begins from the premise
that: "[Property] rights will be redefined from time to time as the rela-
tive values of different uses of land change. '236 Depriving an owner of
230. Epstein states:
Under the present law the institution of private property places scant limitation
upon the size and direction of the government activities that are characteristic of
the modem welfare state .... [T]he eminent domain and parallel clauses [includ-
ing the Takings Clause] in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or sus-
pect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century:
zoning, rent control, worker's compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive
taxation.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN X (1985) [hereinafter PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN].
Pollitt states:
[The] rights of people to acquire, own, use, and enjoy property may themselves be
viewed as a subset of a larger class of rights, the economic liberties. These liber-
ties have been virtually stripped of all protection and forgotten .... [Further, a]
second related function of the takings clause is to encourage government to more
carefully design its regulatory programs to enhance the likelihood that they will
achieve their objectives in a cost-effective manner.... At present regulators and
those who advocate more governmental regulation see regulations as essentially
costless because the public does not spend money directly to acquire a resource
controlled by regulation.
POLLITr, supra note 20, at xxii, xxx.
231. Farber, supra note 218, at 292-94.
232. Id. at 293.
233. Id.
234. Id. As Farber notes, these incentives would lead one to expect that legislators
generally would voluntarily offer compensation for appropriated property when no funda-
mental rule required it. l at 295.
235. POSNER, supra note 160, at 54-55.
236. Id. at 54.
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a right to make a particular use of his property for these reasons re-
flects not the law forcing a suboptimal use on an owner, but a devalua-
tion of the proposed use to the point where it is no longer optimal.237
Accordingly, paying compensation for not undertaking a suboptimal
use cannot improve efficiency. Moreover, even though such uncom-
pensated changes in property rights will reduce the incentive to invest
generally in current land uses, this may be an efficient hedge against
eventual decreases in the values of current uses. Ironically, paying
compensation may induce overinvestment in currently favored land
uses.
2 3 8
The argument that legislators need to be restrained by a compen-
sation rule seems incoherent on another score. The argument de-
pends on the hypothesis that legislators are unlikely to take regulatory
losses into account unless they are monetized through payment of
compensation. But to the extent this is true, it must hold for benefits
as well, legislators are as unlikely to accurately measure regulatory
benefits as regulatory losses. Thus, to the extent that regulatory com-
pensation is required, legislators will underregulate because they will
value paid-for losses more than gains of greater or equal value for
which no money is recouped. 239 Thus, either both regulatory losses
should be compensated and gains taxed (the "windfalls for wipeouts"
approach) or neither should be.240
Land use regulations cannot logically be distinguished in their ca-
pacity to inflict regulatory losses from the ubiquitous business and so-
cial regulations.241 But the Supreme Court has shown absolutely no
interest in applying the regulatory takings doctrine to assets other
than land.242 Doing so would approach denying the legitimacy of leg-
islation tout court. The imposition of such a universal compensation
237. See id. at 54-55.
238. Id. at 60.
239. This argument about incentives complements the pragmatic difficulties encoun-
tered in trying to value both regulatory gains and losses, as described above in the discus-
sion of Great Britain's experience with "worsement" and "betterment." See supra part IV.
In any case, even if a mandatory compensation rule provided appropriate incentives for
investment, the great unpredictability of the regulatory takings doctrine would negate ex
ante the benefits of providing compensation for such takings.
240. This point builds on a seminar comment by professor David Dana. See Donald G.
Hagman, Wipeouts and Their Mitigation, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUT's, supra note 132, at
5-14; Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls and Their Recapture, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS,
supra note 132, at 15-19.
241. This is a point that Richard Epstein repeatedly stresses. See, e.g., PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 230, at 101 ("The differences
among these various forms of [land use and economic] regulation are sure to be important
in any assessment of their economic consequences or their legal justification.... Yet these
protean forms of regulation all amount to partial takings of private property.").
242. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
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requirement would displace voting as the principal means for ensuring
that legislation furthers the public interest. But that is the point, there
is no logical place to draw the line between compensated and uncom-
pensated regulatory losses. The regulatory takings doctrine draws a
line at the boundary between real and personal property,243 but that
drawing is neither historically informed nor consonant with our com-
mon law traditions. 244
Even putting aside all these problems, the extent to which a court
committed to economic analysis could evaluate the benefits gained
from land use regulation would remain doubtful. Development of a
parcel may cause harms that are widespread but that cannot be quan-
tified with any reliability. In principle, the value of a plot of land
when a certain use is permitted can be compared to its value when
that use is not permitted. But permitting (or prohibiting) the use will
have secondary effects on land in the area. My neighbor's land might
be much more valuable to him if he could build an office block on it,
but such development might greatly reduce the value of surrounding
homes; moreover, it might alter commuter traffic patterns in a way
that would have economic repercussions well beyond the immediate
neighborhood. Of course, there is no market for these externalities,
they cannot be bought or sold, so their magnitude and direction can at
best be estimated using crude analogies. As ill-equipped as legislators
and administrative agencies are to make these complex calculations,
courts have even less aptitude for them.245 Moreover, court decisions
are not legitimated by the political process the way legislative actions
are.
Ix
ABOLITION OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE WILL
NOT LEAD TO ANY FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS
TO OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY
Perhaps the most common justification for the regulatory takings
doctrine is that fairness and justice require that some losses imposed
through regulation not be borne by the owner alone but be shifted to
the public at large.246 Preventing fundamental unfairness has some-
243. See Sugameli, supra note 201, at 461; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2899-900 (1992) (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979)).
244. See, e.g., POLLrrr, supra note 20, at 161.
245. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
176 (1971).
246. The language usually cited or paraphrased comes from Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Court there stated: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee
that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id.; see also
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times been a justification for the crafting of protective constitutional
doctrines from the grand generalities of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.247 But eliminating the regulatory takings doctrine will not lead
to the kinds of systematic or socially divisive losses that have been
thought to justify other constitutional doctrines restraining the author-
ity of democratic majorities. The point is not that there never can, nor
ever will, be regulations that impose unfair burdens on some individu-
als, but that there is no constitutional basis for supposing that the
political process cannot adequately address such cases.
Justice Stone put forward the most widely accepted explanation
for invoking constitutional generalities to displace legislative judg-
ments in the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, Inc.248 Justice Stone suggested that laws that do not violate
specific prohibitions of the Constitution but restrict the political pro-
cess or reflect prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities"
might require judicial activism.249 This point has evolved into the fa-
miliar principle that legislation that disproportionately burdens mem-
bers of disfavored groups will more likely be fundamentally unfair
because the members of the groups may not be able to control the
legislature either alone or in coalition.250
Invoking such an argument to defend the regulatory takings doc-
trine would, however, be ludicrous. Real property ownership in the
United States is very widely dispersed,251 and property owners have
the means to be-and are-very politically active in defense of their
interests. Property owners are found in all political camps and coali-
tions. Furthermore, legislatures cater to the concerns of property
owners.252 Local governments, which are dependent on property
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2316 (1994); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264,2292 (1993); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); National Bd.
of Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969).
247. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Judi-
cial review of that guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon this
court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in order to ascer-
tain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice.").
248. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
249. Id.
250. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135 (1980) ("No matter how open the
process, those with most of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the
expense of others, or otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account. 'One person,
one vote,' under these circumstances, makes a travesty of the equality principle.").
251. In 1990, 64.2% of occupied housing units were occupied by the owner, leaving
only 35.8% occupied by renters. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993, at 725 (1993).
252. Home ownership, for example, is supported by a famous tax subsidy. 26 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Moreover, high income owners of beachfront property, very
often expensive vacation homes, have succeeded in obtaining heavily subsidized flood in-
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taxes to finance basic services, are ever eager to promote and preserve
the aggregate value of local real estate.253 The point immediately
seems belabored: no constitutional doctrine can be predicated on a
failure of the political process to properly account for the interests of
property owners.
One argument for constitutional protection of owners emphasizes
the unfairness of surprise: the owner bought property expecting to be
able to develop it for a profit.25 4 While every case will see argument
about what the owner knew or should have expected at the time he
bought the property, such frustration can be guarded against as effec-
tively by eliminating the expectation as by guaranteeing it. Abolishing
the regulatory takings doctrine would mean that no person could form
justifiable expectations about profit until he had some irrevocable per-
mission to build. Indeed, elimination of the regulatory takings doc-
trine may be fairer to the average developer than the current vague
mishmash of doctrine, under which he frequently may be surprised to
discover that courts will not compensate him for the loss of his
expectancy.
It is difficult to formulate any other argument for unconstitu-
tional unfairness in land use regulation. In enumerating losses that
seem maddeningly unfair and ought to be borne by society at large,
few would begin with losses from unexpected inability to develop land
for profit. Catastrophic illness and birth into poverty seem like losses
much easier to justify spreading on grounds of fairness than losses
stemming from a voluntary and considered act like purchasing a par-
cel of land for development. Why should the Constitution be inter-
preted to socialize losses disproportionately falling on moderate and
high income citizens?
It may be argued that intentional infliction of loss on a property
owner through regulation is more objectionable from an ethical stand-
point than the losses that may befall any of us through natural disas-
ters, like illness or floods. But this is unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, social policies contribute substantially to the losses people suffer
from natural disasters; in the United States, we allocate health care by
ability to pay,255 and we subsidize insurance for construction in flood
surance from the federal government. See infra note 256 and accompanying text. The
level of animosity toward property owners in the South Carolina Legislature that passed
the laws struck down in Lucas was undoubtedly quite low.
253. J. BARRY CULLINGWORTH, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF PLANNING 56 (1993).
254. A good example of this expectation is that of Mr. Lucas in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
255. See Double Standard in Health Care, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1991, at A20.
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zones. 256 Second, insofar as regulations enhance overall social well-
being, the losses they inflict as a byproduct may be less regrettable
than losses imposed by blind natural or social forces, even when medi-
ated through politics.
Other constitutional rules will prevent specific types of unfairness
to landowners. Singling out a particular group to bear losses raises
distinct problems dealt with by other constitutional doctrines. 257 The
rule treating a permanent physical invasion as a de facto appropriation
might protect against cases where the government seeks to press prop-
erty into a public use through regulation to avoid payment of compen-
sation. 258 Finally, the Due Process Clause may be interpreted to strike
down laws that seek intentionally to avoid these restrictions or that
fail reasonably to advance the public interest.259
x
THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE PRECLUDES
EMERGING ECOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDINGS
Accumulating scientific research and analysis and the evidence of
our own experience declare that contemporary patterns of human ac-
tivity, including real estate development, severely damage particular
ecosystems and the global biosphere.26° Prophetic voices have urged
for some time now that owners must develop a new land ethic that
does not undermine the environment. 261 Legal scholars and activists
256. Paul Tash, Bill To Limit Flood Insurance Falters, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 17,
1992, at Al; Mary T. Schmich, After Hugo, Residents Rebuild in Spite of Law, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1990, at 12.
257. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (holding that intentional racial discrimination in zoning violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
exclusion of a group home for the mentally retarded from a residential neighborhood vio-
lates the Due Process Clause).
258. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
259. See, e.g., Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the denial of a permit for a fortune telling business in a commercial zone was arbitrary).
260. For a sampling of scientific literature, see DAVID A. DUNNETrE & ROBERT J.
O'BRIEN, THE SCIENCE OF GLOBAL CHANGE (1992); EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIODIVERsrrv
(1988); Paul R. Ehrlich et al., Food Security, Population, Environment, 19 POPULATION &
DEV. REv. 1 (1993).
261. Aldo Leopold stated in The Ecological Conscience:
[Als I understand it, the content [of conservation education) is substantially this:
obey the law, vote right, join some organizations, and practice what conservation
is profitable on your own land; the government will do the rest. Is not this
formula too easy to accomplish anything worth-while? It defines no right or
wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, implies no change in the cur-
rent philosophy of values. In respect of land-use, it urges only enlightened self-
interest.
ALDO LEOPOLD, The Ecological Conscience, in A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC WITH ESSAYS
ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 243-44 (1966). In addition, in The Land Ethic he
stated:
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have begun to incorporate these data and moral visions into proposals
to reshape property law to restrict owners' authority to disrupt the
land's ecological integrity and to elaborate owners' duty to preserve
ecosystems for their own sake and for future generations.262
Regulatory takings cases nearly always involve prohibitions on
schemes to develop a site for profit or pleasure, not restrictions on
existing uses. 263 In constitutionalizing an owner's right to develop his
land according to the promptings of the market, the courts have
promulgated a doctrine that stands in stark conceptual opposition to
emerging notions of green property. Abolition of the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine will permit reformulations of property and land use law
to emerge incrementally and practically from the political process.
This evolution must progress lest our descendants inherit a sick, de-
graded planet.
A new land ethic will differ substantially from classical property
rules, which treat land as an economic resource that must be enclosed
and placed under unified ownership to promote efficient economic de-
ployment.264 Costs not borne by the property owner have been con-
sidered incidental "nuisances" that can be accounted for economically
To sum it up: a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is
hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many
elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as
we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the
economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts.
ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC WITH ESSAYS ON CON-
SERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER, supra, at 251.
More radical voices have emerged as ecological debate has expanded:
Ecological consciousness and deep ecology are in sharp contrast with the domi-
nant world view of technocratic-industrial societies which regard humans as iso-
lated and fundamentally separate from the rest of Nature, as superior to, and in
charge of, the rest of creation. Deep ecological consciousness allows us to see
through these erroneous and dangerous illusions."
Bill Duval & George Sessions, Deep Ecology, in RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: PHILOSO-
PHY AND TACTICS 39 (Peter C. List ed., 1993).
262. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOOLE, JusncE AND THE EARTH (1993); Sax, Takings,
supra note 217; Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the
Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1739
(1992); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239 (1990); David B.
Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Pub-
lic's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENrVTL. L. REv. 311 (1988).
263. The conspicuous exception is the prohibition of a current nuisance, which does
not require compensation, probably even after Lucas. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915). For preexisting uses that conflict with valid regulations, but are not nui-
sances, courts require at least that the use continue for some time so the owner can recover
a substantial part of his previous investment. Harris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 371 A.2d 706
(Md. App. 1977), cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977); Art Neon Co. v. City of Denver, 488
F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Board of Supervisors v. Miller,
170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969).
264. The culturally contingent character of our property regime is captured brilliantly
in WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND (1984).
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through bargaining or litigation among affected parties.2 65 However,
the science of ecology has taught that the connections among parcels
are their essence and that the flows of biological support among orga-
nisms and sustaining resources do not respect legal bounds.266 Prop-
erty rules that are fair and efficient among contending people may not
account for environmental externalities.267
Wetlands have been an obvious subject for conflict between these
differing ideas of property.268 Huge public investments in highways
and demographic changes have made living close to the shore attrac-
tive to more people. Improved technology has enabled developers to
more easily fill wetland areas for housing, agriculture, and commercial
development. But awareness of the importance of wetlands to overall
environmental quality also has grown rapidly. The filling of wetlands
is now known to exacerbate flooding and water pollution and to de-
265. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681
(1973).
266. ROBERT E. RCKLEFS, ECOLOGY 5 (3d ed. 1990) ("Although the plight of endan-
gered species may arouse us emotionally, there is a beginning realization that the only
means of preserving and using natural resources is through the conservation of entire eco-
logical systems and of broad-scale ecological processes."); Daniel H. Jenzen, The Eternal
External Threat, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 286, 287 (Michael E. Soule ed., 1986) (stating
that "while a preserve's boundaries may serve well enough to stop direct human transgres-
sions, the boundaries per se will mean nothing to most organisms"); David S. Maehr, The
Florida Panther and Private Lands, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 167 (1990) (explaining that
the Florida Panther's range includes private lands that are undergoing intensive agriculture
and urban development).
267. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 262, at 32-38.
268. For several reasons, some may argue that property law has fully incorporated eco-
logical norms for those resources covered by the public trust doctrine. First, the doctrine
provides that certain resources, notably lands beneath tidal waters and navigable waters,
are owned by the sovereign in trust for the use and benefit of the public. See generally
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Second, courts have employed the public trust doc-
trine in some notable victories for ecological preservation. See, e.g., National Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Finally,
total prohibitions on private property may survive regulatory takings review, even under
Lucas, because the public trust restraints inhere in the owner's title. See Babcock, supra
note 3, at 3.
On the other hand, the public trust is blunt, overbroad, and underinclusive. See Rich-
ard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of
Environmental Protection and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44
VAND. L. REv. 1209 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.
631 (1986). For those resources to which it applies, it precludes private ownership entirely
and may upset long held expectations. In addition, it does not and cannot apply to most
natural resources long traded in private control. Its application defeats regulatory takings
because of the lame fiction that the sovereign's interest has inhered in the title forever, but
became manifest only through common law adjudication. Perhaps a balanced view would
credit the public trust doctrine primarily for expanding our understanding of how environ-
mental concerns may reshape property, but look elsewhere for a workable maturation of
that process.
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crease fish and waterfowl stocks by destroying spawning and migra-
tion areas.269
State and federal governments have responded to the destruction
of wetlands with numerous laws and programs designed to protect
these resources. 270 Though these regulatory regimes have met with
criticism from numerous perspectives, the basic principle, that the
public ought to have a say about the decision to fill a wetland, has
become firmly established through the political process. Nonetheless,
administrative denials of permits to fill wetlands provide the arche-
typal occasion for regulatory takings cases. 271
On a larger scale, similar environmental effects can occur in all
ecosystems: forests, prairies, rivers, beaches, slopes, and deserts.
272
An environmentally concerned public has a valid interest in all private
decisions to alter natural conditions anywhere because they may con-
tribute to air and water pollution, flooding, decreasing biodiversity,
ozone depletion, broadcasting of toxins, or global warming. While
new construction for vital human needs will certainly continue, recog-
269. Wetlands serve many functions in natural ecosystems. The periodic flooding of
some wetlands provides breeding and foraging grounds for birds and fish of neighboring
waterways and forests. Jon A. Kusler et al., Wetlands, Sci. AM., Jan. 1994, at 64. Wetlands
are also havens for many rare organisms. Of the endangered species listed in 1991, 43%
were dependent on wetlands. MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE
TO SCIENCE, LAW, AND TECHNOLOGY 57 (1993). Wetlands are also among the most pro-
ductive ecosystems in the world, equalling or exceeding tropical rain forests. Id. at 57-60.
The benefits to humans are equally impressive. Floodplains absorb and contain flood-
water, reducing property damage caused by flooding. Id. at 99. Recent floods on the Mis-
souri and Mississippi rivers were exacerbated by the loss of wetlands that could have
absorbed or stored floodwaters. Kusler et al., supra, at 67. Estuarine wetlands help protect
the shoreline from erosion. DENNISON & BERRY, supra, at 130. Wetlands can also capture
and process nutrients and toxins, reducing pollution of lakes, rivers, and aquifers. Id. at 84,
89, 111, 131. Wetlands provide exploitative benefits as well as environmental buffering.
Between 60% and 90% of the U.S. commercial fish catch is attributable to wetlands. Id. at
55. Valuable timber is produced by many swamps. Id. at 89.
This illustrates only a small fraction of the functions and values of wetlands. Econo-
mist F. Gregory Hayden identified 26 specific benefits provided by pristine wetlands. F.
Gregory Hayden, Wetlands Provisions in the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills, 24 J. ECON. ISSUES
575 (1990).
270. Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust
Doctrine on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 539-41 (1994). At the federal level
the primary laws are the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); and the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
271. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
272. See Mostafa K. Tolba, The Global Environment: An Overview, in THE SCIENCE OF
GLOBAL CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1-4
(1992).
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nition of the pervasive externalities of development provides a princi-
pled basis for strong public controls. 273
Much of the Supreme Court's activism in this area seems
designed precisely to forestall whatever political advances green prop-
erty may make. Thus, the Court has ridiculed the idea that ownership
does not include the right to build;274 has established that economic
loss alone can work a taking without regard to public harms (except in
the context of preventing nuisances where specific harms are visited
upon specific neighbors);275 and has assumed the authority to pro-
claim which rights of property are essential. 276 All this has been done
to constitutionalize development rights and to put the private choice
to change the physical conditions of land beyond political control. At
the same time, it seems designed to prop up the classical legal culture
of property rights and to give constitutional sanction to the idea that
legal title gives lordly authority over the Earth.
Of course, it is far from certain that the political process will em-
brace the version of strong environmentalism that I have sketched
here. Few politicians are prepared to run on a platform of more ex-
tensive government power that may well lead to a decrease in aggre-
gate individual wealth as conventionally measured. But the challenge
of the greens should be mediated by the political process, not blunted
by judicial fiat. Political compromises will produce specific, contin-
gent limits on development hedged with exceptions and protections;
only over time and after protracted argument could a green paradigm
emerge. Perpetuating constitutional protection for development
rights will both ensure continued degradation of American ecosystems
273. One should not underestimate the difficulties of establishing the political machin-
ery necessary to control development so as to preserve environmental health without exac-
erbating rent seeking and exclusionary regulation. In general, strong environmentalists
have been long on ideals and short on political architecture.
274. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987) ("The right to
build on one's own property . . . cannot remotely be described as a governmental
benefit.").
275. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992) ("Regula-
tions that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land ... cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.").
Commenting on Lucas, professor Sax states: "[Justice Scalia] had a clear message
which he sought to convey: States may not regulate land use solely by requiring land own-
ers to maintain their property in its natural state as part of a functioning ecosystem, even
though those natural functions may be important to the ecosystem." Joseph L. Sax, Prop-
erty Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1438 (1993).
276. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-88 (1979) ("In this case we hold
that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation.").
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and force strong environmentalists out of the political process into
more extreme denunciations of established orthodoxies.
CONCLUSION
Judged by the traditional criteria of constitutional law, the regula-
tory takings doctrine lacks substantial justification. Neither the text of
the Constitution nor the intent of the framers provides any basis for
using the Just Compensation Clause as a check upon regulation.
Courts for the first 130 years of constitutional adjudication consist-
ently so held. No compelling ethical principle nor structural defect in
the political process justifies permitting judges to determine that some
regulatory laws go "too far." The experience of other democratic na-
tions suggests that no such extraordinary judicial power is needed to
maintain a vital system of private property.
The contest between property rights advocates and ecologists
reveals fundamental disagreements about the place of people in the
world. The former stress individualism, self-interest, liberty, and the
creation of measurable wealth. The latter stress mutual dependence,
cooperation, moral duties toward other forms of life, and spiritual en-
richment. Not surprisingly, the Constitution of the United States does
not enshrine either vision. It creates imperfect representative institu-
tions through which the polity can determine its own future. Inevita-
bly, the clash of differing visions and interests engenders compromise
and inconsistency. The law must accommodate the ecological per-
spective for there to be any hope of preserving an environment in
which future generations can flourish.
ADDENDUM: DETERMINING COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY
LOSSES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS-THE NEED FOR
FURTHER EXAMINATION
My contention that the Constitution cannot be made to yield a
principled standard for determining when compensation should be
paid for regulatory loss requires some discussion of how legislation
should address the compensation issue. Since I have insisted that
compensation for such losses must reflect political judgments about
fairness and efficiency, it seems responsible to indicate what statutory
base for compensation I think appropriate. In this addendum, I
briefly review several bills introduced in Congress and state legisla-
tures to prevent or compensate takings. Then I turn to a statutory
proposal of my own for awarding landowners compensation for
changes in regulations after effective approval for their projects. By
explaining and arguing for this reform, I attempt to indicate a benefi-
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cial avenue for public debate about when compensation for regulation
should be paid.
Numerous "property rights bills" have surfaced in recent years.
Unfortunately, they are a sorry lot.277 They reflect more the desire of
legislators to affirm their rhetorical fidelity to the myth of Property as
a cornerstone of American freedom than they do careful considera-
tion of the actual effects of this concept. To no small extent, they ap-
pear to be vehicles for politicians who wish to derail existing
environmental protections without directly confronting the conse-
quences of doing so.
The bills fall into two categories, which might be labelled "pro-
phylactic" and "compensation." The prophylactic bills278 mandate
that agencies follow certain procedures to protect property rights
when a proposed action might result in a taking. These bills descend
from President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,630.279 Some follow
the Executive order in requiring each agency to establish its own
mechanism to avoid impairing property rights.280 Others actually pro-
vide the mechanism, even going so far as to require a "takings impact
analysis" before initiation of some agency actions.281
The prophylactic bills certainly raise the cost of regulation and
provide stimuli for opponents of regulation. Whether they actually
protect property rights is doubtful. The bills suppose that an agency
can rationally consider whether a proposed regulation will effect a
taking on any piece of property in the United States. But the
Supreme Court has understandably insisted that any regulatory tak-
ings litigation must be property-specific, based upon a full record ex-
ploring all the constitutional factors.282 Thus, in states that have
adopted such prophylactic bills, the issuing agency merely issues a cir-
cumlocution concluding that whether a taking will occur depends on
the facts.283 In practice, the prophylactic bills will merely churn the
277. Protecting Private Property Rights from Regulatory Takings: Hearings on H.R. 9
Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of J. Peter Byrne) ("In brief, I believe that it would be
difficult to denounce H.R. 9 with sufficient vehemence. It is profoundly stupid and deeply
cynical.").
278. See H.R. 561,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3875, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994);
S. 1915, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 22, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 204-14.
280. See H.R. 3875, supra note 278; S. 1915, supra note 278.
281. See S. 605, supra note 278; S. 22, supra note 278.
282. See supra part IIl.
283. See Private Property Protection Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 561 Before the Sub-
comm. on Dep't Operations & Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agric., 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 53 (1993) (statement of Ralph S. "lyler, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland).
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regulatory waters and allow interested parties another opportunity to
argue about the effects of proposed action.
The most prominent compensation bills require federal payment
to property owners whenever wetlands or endangered species regula-
tions reduce the market value of "an affected portion" of an owner's
land by some percentage. 284 These bills depart dramatically from con-
stitutional doctrine, authorizing compensation for any designated dim-
inution in value without regard to justification for the restriction or to
an owner's expectations.285 Moreover, the bills require compensation
in nearly every instance that a regulation affects a parcel, since the
bills take the narrowest possible baseline to determine decreases in
value. That is, they measure the decrease in value only of the affected
portion of land, not of the entire parcel. 286 If enacted, such bills will
either require massive transfers to owners of environmentally sensi-
tive lands or halt federal land use regulation.287
Though the current debate in Washington, as exemplified by the
bills described above, rarely allows the realities of environmental deg-
radation to intrude, legislation can provide for compensation in a way
that promotes justice to landowners without precluding substantive
restrictions on use to secure environmental protection. I suggest that
states and the federal government adopt statutes that confer property
rights upon landowners once they have received site-specific regula-
tory permission for a development. A statute that did this could man-
date compensation for losses imposed by subsequent changes in
applicable requirements for, say, three years. Not only would such a
statute protect owners against frustration of justifiable reliance upon
regulatory permission, but it would shape those expectations ex ante
to promote more socially beneficial behavior by both owners and reg-
ulators. In short, such a statute would be a sensible adjustment to the
ubiquity of land use regulation rather than an attempt to destroy it.
Owners permitted to develop their property under existing laws
have very limited protection against changes in the law that may
render their intended project unlawful. Certainly, the purchase of
land or the formulation of a development project grants them no
284. S. 1915, supra note 278; H.R. 3875, supra note 278. House Bill 925, recently
passed by the House of Representatives and currently pending before the Senate, requires
compensation when agency action reduces the value of property by more than 20%, but
this appears to be a device to numb opponents to compensating slightly larger losses. Sen-
ate Bill 605, also pending in the Senate, sets the threshold at 33% reduction. S. 605, supra
note 278.
285. See supra parts I-III.
286. S. 605, supra note 278, § 204(a)(2)(B)-(C).
287. Most are designed to gut regulatory enforcement through the single technique of
requiring compensation awards to be paid from the responsible agency in operating appro-
priation. See S. 605, supra note 278, § 204(f).
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rights against changes in zoning or other broadly applicable regula-
tions (other than those unpredictably conferred by the Takings
Clause). Even the issuance of a subdivision approval or building per-
mit does not give per se protection against changes.
The judge-made doctrine of equitable estoppel, which in some
states takes on a constitutional dimension, does afford some limited
protection. 288 Under this doctrine, courts may thus enjoin application
of new requirements or order compensation when the owner makes
concrete investments in development, such as construction costs, in
reasonable reliance upon a specific government permission.289 But ju-
dicial protection under equitable estoppel remains weak and uncer-
tain. States vary greatly in the point at which an owner's actions gain
protection and in the type of investments that should be compen-
sated.290 Judicial reluctance to tie the hands of local legislators and
the proliferation of permitting authorities have in many jurisdictions
postponed the point at which a developer can be assured that she will
be able to recover her investment. 291 Moreover, courts differ on
which investments precipitate a reliance interest.292 Few will compen-
288. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 6.12-.23 (3d ed. 1993).
289. Id. §§ 6.12-.13.
290. CHARLES L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
EXPECTATIONS 6-46 (1982). For example, compare Town of Paradise Valley v. Golf Lei-
sure Corp., 557 P.2d 532, 540-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that a developer who ob-
tained and relied upon a special use permit in Arizona acquired a vested right to complete
the development in spite of changes in lot size regulations that appeared to block construc-
tion of the hotel) with Hill Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Passaic, 384 A.2d 172, 175 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (stating that a developer seeking to build an apartment complex
in New Jersey did not gain a vested right to complete the project by relying on an approved
site plan, demolition permit, and a permit authorizing excavation and foundation work).
291. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Comm'n,
553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
Kentucky courts, although professing that "there is no justification for reliance on [an
invalid] permit," apply the "honest error" doctrine to allow a landowner to estop the gov-
ernment from blocking a development that proceeds under a bad permit. City of Berea v.
Wren, 818 S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). Delaware courts reject the "honest
error" doctrine, allowing the government to revoke an invalid building permit. Miller v.
Board of Adjustment, 521 A.2d 642, 647 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
292. Despite the "unrecoverable [financial] loss" caused by new regulations affecting a
parcel, New Hampshire courts conclude that "money spent for the acquisition of property
itself is properly excluded from consideration [as reliance]." Gosselin v, City of Nashua,
321 A.2d 593, 596 (N.H. 1974). Florida courts, on the other hand, consider the purchase of
a specific parcel and investment in architectural fees, when combined with the fact that the
city had previously rezoned the land at the purchaser's request, as a sufficient reliance to
estop the city from revoking its approval. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So.
2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Without specific comment, a Missouri court in-
cluded the purchase price in measuring reliance. May Dep't Stores v. County of St. Louis,
607 S.W.2d 857, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also MANDELKER, supra note 288, § 6.21
(citing additional examples of courts granting and denying reliance after excavation).
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sate for the decreased market value of the property under the new
restrictions.293
This regime creates perverse incentives for both developers and
regulators. The uncertainty of future regulation increases the cost of
development. Developers may delay expenditures or underinvest due
to uncertainty about whether they will be able to proceed as planned.
Some may overinvest in an attempt to demonstrate sufficient reliance
to support an equitable claim. The ability of regulators to change
their minds also encourages the ad hoc, amateur quality of much local
land use regulation, where response to short-term political pressures
substitutes for comprehensive, informed, long-term planning. 294
A statute providing a developer with a property right to pursue
an approved development plan upon the issuance of a crucial permit
would foster several systematic benefits. A reasonable time limitation
for permits, perhaps three years, would allow government to respond
to changes in circumstances and overall goals. It would also authorize
government to take action needed to address hazards that pose seri-
ous threats to public health and safety. But the thrust of the statute
would be to give property status to the approved development plan at
a clear point in the process, so that non-excepted subsequent prohibi-
tions on completion would require payment of compensation to the
owner.
295
Such a statute would have several advantages over existing law.
It would allow the developer of a permitted project to proceed with
investments in her plan at a pace dictated by market considerations
rather than by regulatory concerns. The statute would guide the de-
velopment of the owner's expectations: before the permit, all expecta-
tions are speculative; afterward, they receive the concrete protections
inherent in traditional property law. Establishing such a clear vesting
point in the permitting process improves both fairness and efficiency.
This statute (in conjunction with the abolition of constitutional
regulatory takings review) would give regulators substantial discretion
to determine what uses will be allowed on any parcel. 296 But it would
also require them to assemble information and make decisions at an
293. See MANDELKER, supra note 288, § 2.05. But in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-900 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court allowed full compensa-
tion for plaintiff's land due to new state restrictions regarding development of barrier is-
lands. For a full discussion, see supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
294. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 253, at 12-14.
295. This development right should be freely assignable, since it would be treated as a
ripe economic entitlement.
296. Opposition to such vesting legislation may often reflect concerns that local land
use ordinances and institutions are inadequate to control the types of development current
in the jurisdiction. My proposal assumes that such local powers are adequate. If they are
not, their substantial improvement could be part of a legislative compromise that could
include prospective vesting rules.
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appropriate stage of the process. Mandating a vesting permit provides
a clear focus for public debate about the appropriateness of the pro-
posed development. Moreover, the significance of the vesting permit
should encourage collaboration among regulatory bodies, furthering
the important goal of having only a single development permit.297
In short, such a statute would provide an appropriate adjustment
for both owners and regulators to the reality that land use regulation
in a crowded and polluted nation must be pervasive and rigorous but
also fair, efficient, and sophisticated. Such statutes are a common fea-
ture of comprehensive European land use laws.298
Several states have adopted statutes that move toward vesting de-
velopment rights upon the issuance of a central permit.29 9 Many are
quite incomplete. Some apply only to platting of subdivisions. Some
apply only to requirements for individual permits and do not address
changes in requirements for other approvals. Recently enacted laws
in Colorado and North Carolina provide better models. 3°° Both laws
297. See Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Per-
mits, 11 Sw. U. L. REv. 545, 572-73 (1979).
298. See supra part IV (discussing English, French, and German land use laws).
299. Since 1975, Massachusetts law has provided that a development not conforming
with new zoning regulations may continue if a "building or special permit" was issued
before notice of the new regulation. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West 1994).
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and California allow developers who hold approved subdivision
plans to pursue their projects for a specified number of years under regulations in force at
the time of approval. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49, -52 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (stating
that rights vest for three years after preliminary approval and two years after final ap-
proval); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66452.6, 66474.2, 66498.1, 66498.9 (Deering 1987 & Supp.
1995) (stating that rights vest after filing of a "vesting tentative map" and a final map); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 45-23-40(G) (Supp. 1995) (stating that an approved subdivision master plan
vests rights for one year with one-year extension upon request).
Several jurisdictions also allow developers and municipalities to enter into develop-
ment agreements that vest similar rights. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5
(Deering 1987 & Supp. 1995).
300. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-101 to -106 (West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 153A-344.1 (1993). The statutes are virtually identical in substance. The Colorado stat-
ute provides:
A vested property right shall be deemed established with respect to any property
upon the approval, or conditional approval, of a site-specific development plan,
following notice and public hearing, by the local government in which the prop-
erty is situated. Such vested property right shall attach to and run with the appli-
cable property and shall confer upon the owner the right to undertake and
complete the development and use of said property under the terms and condi-
tions of the site specific development plan..
Site specific development plan may be in the form of, but is not limited to...
a planned unit development plan, a subdivision plat, a specially planned area, a
planned building group, a general submission plan, a preliminary or general de-
velopment plan, a conditional or special use plan, a development agreement, or
any other land use approval designation as may be utilized by a local government.
A property right which has been vested ... shall remain vested for a period
of three years .... Notwithstanding [the vesting provisions], local governments
are hereby authorized to enter into development agreements with landowners
providing that property rights shall be vested for a period exceeding three years
where warranted ....
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vest development rights upon the approval of a "site-specific develop-
ment plan," but allow the locality to indicate which permit so func-
tions. The vesting permit allows the developer to complete her
project according to the terms and conditions of the approved plan.
The developer must still obtain all necessary permits, but only accord-
ing to the rules in force at the time of vesting.301.
An addendum to an article about constitutional requirements is
not a propitious place for a discussion of the details of such a statutory
scheme. The Colorado statute has been criticized on several points,
and some of these merit attention.30 2 Professor Hagman thought that
such statutes should protect only actual reliance, 30 while I am in-
clined to believe that they should protect an owner's entire expecta-
tion for development, including the increased value in the land. But
this addendum will have served its purpose if it points toward the type
of discussion we should have about compensation statutes; they
should acknowledge the propriety of public control over development
decisions, but establish ex ante rules that foster regulation that pro-
ceeds fairly and efficiently.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-103(1), -104(2)-(4).
301. Both the Colorado and North Carolina statutes provide that regulations passed
after the vesting point may be enforced if the landowner is compensated for: "[A]II costs,
expenses, and liabilities incurred by the landowner, including, but not limited to, all fees
paid in consideration of financing, and all architectural, planning, marketing, legal, and
other consultants' fees incurred after approval .... [C]ompensation shall not include any
diminution in the value of the property." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-68-105(c). North
Carolina's statute differs insignificantly. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-344.1(e)(1)(c). Neither
statute explicitly provides an equitable remedy.
302. Michael M. Schultz, Vested Property Rights in Colorado, the Legislature Rushes in
Where.... 66 DENV. L. REV. 31 (1988). Schultz argues that Colorado's safety exception is
too narrow. Id. at 58-60. He also notes that unless neighbors act early in the process these
concerns will not be addressed. See id. at 58. Unfortunately, neighbors are frequently
unconcerned until there is visible evidence of development. Id. His further complaint that
the statute encourages "warehousing" of approved development rights seems misplaced;
vested rights last only three years. See id. at 60. Moreover, a market for permitted devel-
opment projects may emerge that could foster efficiencies in obtaining permits and
construction.
303. Hagman, supra note 297, at 565.
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